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Article 
Culture as a Structural Problem in 
Indigent Defense 
Eve Brensike Primus† 
  INTRODUCTION   
There is a serious cultural problem in many indigent de-
fense delivery systems nationwide: too many lawyers appointed 
to represent poor criminal defendants do not perform their in-
tended role in the system, because they have been conditioned 
not to fight for their clients. As a result, many indigent defend-
ants who go through the criminal justice system (as well as the 
friends and families of defendants who suffer through these or-
deals with them) feel confused, angry, and ignored.1 They have 
no faith in the system or in the legitimacy of their convictions.2 
Rather, they experience the criminal justice system as an as-
sembly line to prison, mostly for poor people of color. 
This cultural problem afflicts most, but not all, indigent de-
fense delivery systems and the problem exists to varying de-
grees across jurisdictions. Many defenders perform valiantly 
under trying circumstances and manage to provide zealous, cli-
ent-centered defense advocacy. Given the obstacles that defense 
lawyers for the indigent face, the work of these excellent de-
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I thank Lauren 
Sudeall Lucas and the participants at the Minnesota Law Review’s 100th An-
niversary Symposium celebration for helpful comments and Megan DeMarco 
for invaluable research assistance. I would also like to thank the many indi-
gent defense attorneys who provided me with data and feedback about this 
project and who continue to fight for their clients’ rights every day. Finally, I 
would like to recognize the generous support of the William W. Cook Endow-
ment at the University of Michigan. Copyright © 2016 by Eve Brensike Pri-
mus. 
 1. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Crimi-
nal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005) (discussing the harms of not 
listening to defendants). 
 2. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defi-
ance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013) 
(discussing the perceived lack of legitimacy). 
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fenders is often nothing short of remarkable. But the difference 
between valiant defenders and those who are unable to provide 
zealous representation is not always a matter of the individual 
characteristics of the particular lawyers in question. It is also 
often traceable to a difference in the professional cultures in 
which they work.3 Many defenders sincerely want to be effec-
tive advocates for their clients, or at least they had that desire 
at some point in their careers, but the system and its concomi-
tant pressures beat the fight out of them. 
It comes as no surprise to close observers of indigent de-
fense delivery systems that this culture of indifference exists.4 
Consider the environment in which we ask indigent defense at-
torneys to work. They are loathed by many in society, because 
their job is to make arguments on behalf of murderers, rapists, 
and child molesters.5 In the public’s view, defenders rely on le-
gal technicalities to get criminals off and send them back to the 
streets to select their next victims.6 A public defender loses 
track of the number of times she is asked “how do you repre-
 
 3. By “culture,” I mean to be describing the shared behaviors, attitudes, 
and beliefs characteristic of those who provide indigent defense in a given ju-
risdiction. Of course, every jurisdiction has different people with different per-
sonalities and approaches, but the structure of indigent defense delivery in a 
jurisdiction can cultivate and perpetuate behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs to-
ward the work that the attorneys do. These shared goals and norms define the 
setting in which indigent defense lawyering happens and shape the ways in 
which indigent defense services are provided going forward.  
 4. Indeed, I am not the first person to recognize the cultural problems in 
the system and the need to redress them. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An 
Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 81 (1995); Jonathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using 
Organizational Culture To Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177 
(2008). 
 5. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 4, at 86 (“Public defenders are often 
viewed by the public as either incompetent at what they do or immoral for do-
ing it.” (footnote omitted)); Corrupt Public Defender Arrested, POLITICAL FO-
RUM.COM (Jan. 29, 2015 11:36 AM), http://www.politicalforum.com/political 
-opinions-beliefs/393844-corrupt-public-defender-arrested.html (“Public de-
fenders are THE SCUM OF THE EARTH.”); Why People Think Criminal De-
fense Lawyers Are Scum, A PUBLIC DEFENDER (Nov. 25, 2009), http:// 
apublicdefender.com/2009/11/25/why-people-think-criminal-defense-lawyers 
-are-scum. 
 6. See Andrea M. Vargo, Book Note, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1058, 1058 
(1984) (reviewing JAMES S. KUNEN, “HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?” 
THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983)) (“[T]he public often perceives the 
defense attorney, particularly the public defender, as an obstructor [sic] of jus-
tice, a master of constitutional technicalities who springs the jailhouse lock 
and releases the criminal on an unsuspecting public.”). 
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sent those people” or “how do you sleep at night?”7 And the hos-
tility that defenders feel is not limited to public encounters on 
the streets; it is a daily part of their lives. Judges, prosecutors, 
and court personnel associate defenders with criminals. As a 
result, they often view them as conniving, untrustworthy, and 
unethical.8 Defenders are obstacles to the quick and easy pro-
cessing of cases, and no one likes obstacles. It is easy for judges, 
prosecutors, and court personnel to make the life of a defender 
miserable. Imagine what life is like when no one in your work-
ing environment is willing to cut you a break or help you out, 
when everyone is waiting (and hoping) for you to screw up, and 
when the environment is, by definition, adversarial.  
Now add to that an unreasonable and unmanageable work-
load. The American Bar Association guidelines recommend that 
no defender handle more than 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanor 
cases in a year,9 but a 2009 report found that defenders in New 
Orleans Parish were handling the equivalent of 19,000 misde-
meanor cases per attorney annually.10 That means an average 
of about seven minutes per case.11 In Florida’s Miami-Dade 
County, public defenders have been forced to handle more than 
700 felony cases per year.12 In Chicago, Miami, and Atlanta, de-
fenders had more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases a year.13 With 
so many cases, defenders are unable even to meet with each 
 
 7. Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me To Do a Good 
Job Representing My Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken-its 
-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story 
.html (“I’ve been asked by my family members, my friends and my hairdresser 
why I represent criminals.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Timothy Young, The Dark Side?, NAT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. DEF. 
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.publicdefenders.us/?q=node/526 (describing one 
public defender’s encounter with a judge who described him as being on “the 
dark side” and explained that money was wasted on public defenders).  
 9. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN 
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002), http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_ 
defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
TEN PRINCIPLES]. 
 10. Robert C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Ter-
rible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. 
LAW. 21 (2009), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ 
misdemeanor_20090401.pdf. 
 11. Id. 
 12. KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR 
PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 91–94 (2013). 
 13. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10 (reporting excessive caseloads in 
Texas, Arizona, Tennessee, Utah, and Kentucky as well). 
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client before trial. By necessity, defendants are depersonalized 
and their cases are triaged according to the charges.  
A defender’s day often consists of running from courtroom 
to courtroom with a huge stack of files under her arm. Each 
courtroom is a hostile working environment. The judges, most 
of whom are former prosecutors, are impatiently waiting for the 
defender to hurry up and dispose of her cases so they can clear 
their heavily-congested dockets.14 As one Ohio judge bluntly 
stated as he held a public defender in contempt for indicating 
that he could not represent a man he had only just met, “public 
defenders often plead their clients guilty only minutes after 
meeting them. . . . [You] spent 20 minutes with him, which is 
probably all the time you’re going to spend with a client.”15 Giv-
en these circumstances, it is remarkable that so many criminal 
defenders do continue to show high levels of commitment to 
giving their clients the best possible representation. And it is 
not at all remarkable that many defenders compromise, or be-
come worn down, and deliver considerably less. 
The prosecutors, whose jobs are supposed to involve doing 
“justice,” often have no sympathy for the caseload pressures of 
a defender and will even use the pressure that a defender is 
under to take advantage of the situation. Consider, for exam-
ple, one case in which the trial judge allowed a Miami public 
defender to withdraw from a complex first-degree felony carry-
ing a potential life sentence because that attorney already had 
164 pending felony cases and asserted that he could not effec-
tively take on another serious felony case.16 The prosecutor in 
that case appealed the trial court decision.17 One wonders what 
could have motivated the prosecutor to appeal this defender’s 
withdrawal other than a desire to take advantage of the de-
fender’s inability to provide adequate representation. Or con-
sider a recent Tennessee bill that was requested by the district 
attorney’s office, which would repeal a twenty-three-year-old 
law that requires counties to give seventy-five cents to public 
 
 14. Id. at 44. 
 15. Milan Simonich, Contempt Upheld for Ohio Public Defender, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 25, 2007), http://www.post-gazette.com/ 
frontpage/2007/08/24/Contempt-upheld-for-Ohio-public-defender/stories/ 
200708240267.  
 16. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261 
(Fla. 2013). 
 17. Id. 
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defenders’ offices for every dollar it gives to the prosecution.18 
What could motivate the prosecutors’ office to push for this leg-
islation other than a desire to get more funding at the expense 
of defense funding?19 
Often, there is very little support for defenders who face 
this avalanche of work and hostility. Many American counties 
still rely on an assigned-counsel system as their primary source 
of indigent defense representation.20 These assigned lawyers 
typically don’t have the money for adequate support staff or in-
vestigators.21 Many defenders are solo practitioners who have 
no support staff whatsoever.22 They don’t get any real training 
aside from their law school experience and maybe an occasional 
continuing-legal-education seminar here and there. Many at-
torneys who do this work started doing it as young and inexpe-
rienced lawyers straight out of law school.23 Without any real 
oversight or feedback, the only cues they have for how to shape 
their behavior come from more experienced lawyers practicing 
in that jurisdiction. New defenders quickly learn that the de-
fender who is well-liked in the “courthouse family” is the one 
who is efficient and doesn’t rock the boat or impede the work-
 
 18. S.B. 1324, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2015), http://wapp.capitol.tn 
.gov/apps/BillInfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=SB1324&GA=109.  
 19. See Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 14 (concluding based on a na-
tional study of misdemeanor courts that prosecutors and judges “push[] de-
fenders to take action with inadequate time, despite knowing that the defense 
attorney lacks appropriate information about the case and the client”). 
 20. STEPHEN D. OWEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 246683, INDI-
GENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, FY 2008–2012 (2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/idsus0812.pdf [hereinafter INDIGENT DE-
FENSE SERVICES]; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent 
Criminal Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
505, 513–17 (2015) (describing assigned-counsel systems). 
 21. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla., 115 So. 3d at 278 (“[De-
fense a]ttorneys almost never visited the crime scenes, were unable to proper-
ly investigate or interview witnesses themselves, often had other attorneys 
conduct their depositions, and were often unprepared to proceed to trial when 
the case was called.”); Rapping, supra note 4, at 185 (describing the lack of 
funding for experts or investigation in New Orleans pre-Katrina). 
 22. See, e.g., Testimony of David E. Clark, Trial Attorney, at 42, State v. 
Randolph, No. 13-33003-FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015) (on file with author) 
(noting that he does not have any investigators, law clerks, or paralegals and 
stating “[w]hen you call my office you get me”). 
 23. See Leon Thomas David, Institutional or Private Counsel: A Judge’s 
View of the Public Defender System, 45 MINN. L. REV. 753, 757 (1961) (noting 
that “[b]y tradition . . . appointments fall to the newer members of the bar”). 
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ings of the assembly line machine. The message to a new de-
fender is clear: go along and don’t fight too hard.24  
And if the messaging isn’t clear enough, many defenders 
have financial incentives to avoid zealously representing their 
clients. In some jurisdictions, assigned counsel is paid an hour-
ly rate (which is often abysmally low)25 to handle indigent de-
fense cases. One might imagine that an hourly rate creates an 
incentive for lawyers to spend more time, not less, on each case. 
But the ability of assigned counsel to make a living depends on 
their ability to keep getting assigned to cases—indeed, to many 
cases. Often, the judges before whom these attorneys appear 
are the ones who assign the cases, and they do so not on the ba-
sis of how zealous the defender’s representation is but based on 
how quickly the defender will dispose of his cases and clear the 
judge’s docket.26  
Not all assigned defenders are paid per hour; some are 
paid a flat fee as part of a contract to represent all of the indi-
gent defendants who come through the courthouse.27 Of course, 
the flat fee is so low28 that these attorneys often have to seek 
other means of supplementing their incomes, which only de-
tracts from the amount of time that they have to spend on their 
 
 24. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 38 (describing a number of juris-
dictions in which appointed attorneys never requested funds for experts or in-
vestigative services). 
 25. See REBECCA A. DESILETS ET AL., SPANGENBURG GROUP, RATES OF 
COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELO-
NY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW (2007) http://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_ 
defendants/ls_sclaid_def_2007felony_comp_rates_update_nonfelony 
.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that many jurisdictions only pay $40–$50 per 
hour). There are often caps on the total fees that an attorney can be paid and 
these are also quite low. See id. at 9–16 (noting fee caps of $500 in one Okla-
homa county, $650 in New Mexico, and $1250 in Illinois). 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
 27. Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 514 (describing this system). 
 28. One recent study concluded that, in light of the flat fees paid to Phila-
delphia appointed counsel, they would effectively be paid $2 per hour if they 
put in the number of hours required to provide effective representation. James 
M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? 
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 
196 (2012); see also Kim Bellware, If You’re a Poor Defendant in Utah, Good 
Luck: You’ll Need It, HUFFPOST POL. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/utah-indigent-defense-report_us_563a4849e4b0b24a 
ee486669 (describing one Utah contract defense attorney who was paid a $600 
flat fee to handle 246 cases, which translated to an average of $30 per case). 
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cases.29 Moreover, with high caseloads, no real oversight, and 
no financial incentive to take cases to trial, these defenders 
have every incentive to plead out their cases as quickly as pos-
sible.30 After all, defenders like these also need to stay in the 
good graces of the officials who hire them, and the interests of 
those officials again sound largely in clearing the docket. 
In much of this Article, I will explain that the sources of 
the culture of indifference that affects too many criminal de-
fenders has structural causes and that the structure of criminal 
defense in jurisdictions with public defender offices helps fight 
against that culture. That is, public defender offices create a 
different culture from the one that dominates in most assigned-
counsel jurisdictions, such that public defenders are better able 
to provide zealous representation even in the face of the serious 
headwinds that blow in the faces of all lawyers who represent 
indigent defendants. That said, public defender offices are not 
immune from the pressures of the system either. Many public 
defender agencies face crushing caseloads and do not have suf-
ficient resources to provide adequate support for their line at-
torneys.31 Although some public defender offices provide excel-
lent training, others send their entry-level attorneys into court 
with no training and no supervision.32 And when administra-
tors in some of these offices have tried to stand up to politically-
appointed oversight boards that demand budget cuts and try to 
lower the quality of defense representation, they have lost their 
jobs.33 
What is the result of a system that vilifies defenders, gives 
them an unmanageable workload, underpays them, fails to 
train them, and doesn’t adequately support or supervise them? 
Many zealous defenders who care about their clients burn out 
 
 29. Rapping, supra note 4, at 189 (describing the prevalence of this prac-
tice in New Orleans where public defenders were only paid $29,000 a year). 
 30. Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 515 (discussing the perverse incentives 
in assigned-counsel programs). 
 31. Peng, supra note 7 (describing one public defender office with nine in-
vestigators to handle more than 18,000 cases a year). 
 32. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 39–40 (describing this problem); 
see also THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINU-
ING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 92 (2009), http:// 
www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DE-
NIED]. 
 33. See, e.g., Julie Bykowicz & Tricia Bishop, Top Md. Public Defender Is 
Fired, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 22, 2009), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009 
-08-22/news/0908210179_1_forster-public-defender-outsource.  
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fast and leave the job.34 Of those who remain, many perform 
valiantly. But the sheer reality of the difficult task that these 
lawyers are expected to do is often overwhelming. Especially in 
contexts where indigent defense lawyers lack institutional sup-
port, even lawyers who wish to take their obligations seriously 
sometimes find themselves overwhelmed and gradually become 
less sensitive to the routine injustices of the system.35 Others 
become cynical and depressed, and unhappily continue in the 
job—aware of the problems, but feeling powerless to effectuate 
change.36 Either way, they communicate these feelings (or lack 
thereof) to their clients, sometimes overtly and often more sub-
tly.  
Indigent criminal defendants routinely complain that their 
trial attorneys don’t listen to them, don’t communicate with 
them or tell them what is going on, and seem to have already 
determined that they are guilty.37 These are not just the sour 
grapes complaints of losing parties. As a trial-level public de-
fender, I have seen this firsthand. I have been in the jail lock 
up at the courthouse and seen appointed attorneys walk into 
the cell block on their client’s trial date and say, “Hi. I have 
been appointed to represent you. Here is what is going to hap-
pen. The prosecutor has offered you a really good deal, and I 
think that you should take it.” No introductions, no questions, 
no attempt to hear the client’s story, no respect. And as an ap-
pellate-level public defender, I have called trial attorneys to get 
a sense of what happened at trial only to hear them say things 
like, “the client was obviously lying so I didn’t bother to inves-
tigate.”  
My experiences are not unique.38 Many indigent defendants 
wait weeks and even months in jail before they have initial con-
tact with a lawyer only to have that attorney come and spend 
less than five minutes speaking to them before disposing of 
 
 34. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 43, 46–47 (describing high turno-
ver rates). 
 35. Id. at 31 (quoting one Chicago public defender supervisor as saying 
that young attorneys coming out of law school want to take cases to trial, but 
“they tend to get beaten down by the system”). 
 36. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 4, at 85 (describing the “cynicism and 
disillusionment” that public defenders develop). 
 37. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 35 (noting that clients feel like “a 
cog in a large wheel”); Ogletree, supra note 4, at 87 (noting that clients rou-
tinely blame their public defenders for the faults of the system). 
 38. See Rapping, supra note 4 (describing similar stories from New Orle-
ans). 
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their case through a plea.39 When these defendants try to ex-
plain the ways that they feel the police or others have wronged 
them, the defender often shakes her head and says, “we can’t 
talk about that in the courtroom,” “the judge won’t want to hear 
about that,” or “that is not what this case is about.” Having 
been shut down by his own attorney, the indigent defendant 
now understandably feels misunderstood, angry, and embit-
tered. All that the defendant’s family and friends see is another 
member of their community being processed through the sys-
tem with little explanation. Sometimes, the defendant is cor-
ralled into the courtroom with a bunch of others for a group 
plea under which the trial judge advises them all together of 
the rights that they are giving up and then goes down the line 
to ask them individually if they each know what rights they are 
foregoing and if they want to plead guilty to their respective of-
fenses.40 It is no wonder that so many members of poor commu-
nities have so little faith in the system.41 
Any discussion of how to give meaning to the right to coun-
sel has to grapple with this deep-rooted cultural problem.42 Our 
system doesn’t care about or listen to the people it imprisons. 
That is a serious problem in any system that wants to be 
viewed as legitimate in the eyes of its people, but it is particu-
larly problematic in an adversarial system that relies on de-
fenders being able to do their jobs effectively to justify its re-
 
 39. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven per-
cent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the 
result of guilty pleas.”); Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 
115 So. 3d 261, 278 (Fla. 2013) (“Witnesses from the Public Defender’s Office 
described ‘meet and greet pleas’ as being routine procedure.”); ABA STANDING 
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 16 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (describing “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” 
practices); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 87 (talking about delays); 
Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 31. Attorneys need to meet with indigent 
clients soon after they enter the system to let them know that someone is go-
ing to be an advocate for them. Too many defendants linger in prison for 
weeks or even months before anyone interviews them. This delay not only un-
dermines their faith in the system; it also makes them feel abandoned and ul-
timately distrustful when the defense attorney shows up and says that she 
cares and is there to help.  
 40. See United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693–94 (9th Cir. 
2009) (condemning this practice but describing any error as harmless). Lest 
readers think that this practice is now obsolete, I had the misfortune of watch-
ing pleas being taken en masse in the Genesee County courthouse in Michigan 
just a few months ago. 
 41. Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 507 (discussing cynicism). 
 42. See Rapping, supra note 4, at 180–81 (making a similar claim). 
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sults. It is no wonder that more and more wrongful convictions 
are emerging as scientific advances like DNA testing become 
more available.43 Of course innocents are convicted when the 
adversarial system breaks down. But it isn’t and shouldn’t just 
be about the innocent. Even the guilty deserve to be treated 
fairly, to be heard, and to receive just and proportionate sen-
tences.44 As Gideon v. Wainwright45 reached its fiftieth anniver-
sary, scholars, practitioners, and politicians began a call to 
arms to address the indigent defense crisis.46 It is not the first 
time that experts have come together to talk about what the 
right to counsel means. Two years before Gideon v. Wainwright 
was decided, Justice William Douglas joined a distinguished 
group of practitioners and academics to advocate a constitu-
tional right to counsel.47 When those judges, scholars, and ex-
perts came together, there was a sense that change was com-
ing. Public defender systems existed in some form in thirteen 
states.48 In 1959, a Special Committee of the Association of the 
Bar of New York City and the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association issued a report describing qualitative standards for 
these emerging public defender organizations.49 One year later, 
Congress passed the District of Columbia Legal Aid Act, which 
provided for a system of appointed counsel in Washington, 
D.C.,50 and Congress was entertaining legislation designed to 
 
 43. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: 
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) (describing wrongful con-
victions). 
 44. One former defender in Minnesota, Emily Baxter, has launched a pro-
ject designed to show how everyone in society has violated the law at one time 
or another but only twenty-five percent of people are caught and prosecuted 
for their offenses. Her study documents how “We are all Criminals” who de-
serve fair, individualized treatment in and by the system. See WE ARE ALL 
CRIMINALS, http://www.weareallcriminals.org (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 45. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 46. See Symposium, The Failures of Gideon and New Paths Forward, 12 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307 (2015); Symposium, Gideon at 50: Reassessing the 
Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 835 (2013); Symposium, The Gideon 
Effect: Rights, Justice, and Lawyers Fifty Years After Gideon v. Wainwright, 
122 YALE L.J. 2106 (2013); see also Gideon at 50, THE CHAMPION, June 2012. 
 47. See William O. Douglas, Foreword: The Right to Counsel, 45 MINN. L. 
REV. 693 (1961). 
 48. See Emanuel Celler, Federal Legislative Proposals To Supply Paid 
Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 45 MINN. L. REV. 697, 699 
(1961). 
 49. See Herman I. Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 MINN. L. REV. 
737, 737 (1961) (discussing this report). 
 50. District of Columbia Legal Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 86-531, 74 Stat. 229 
(1960).  
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provide indigent federal defendants more broadly with appoint-
ed counsel.51 The Supreme Court’s incorporation revolution was 
beginning52 and, one opinion from the High Court had even 
made the bold pronouncement that “[t]here can be no equal jus-
tice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount 
of money he has.”53 Justice Douglas and others recognized that 
change was possible and used the pages of this law review to 
advocate a broad constitutional right to counsel that encom-
passed zealous, publicly-funded representation for indigent 
criminal defendants (both juvenile and adult) at trial and on 
appeal.  
That symposium was filled with hope and ideas and, in the 
ten years that followed, it seemed that many of those ideas 
would become realities. The Supreme Court issued its decisions 
in Gideon v. Wainwright,54 Douglas v. California,55 and Miran-
da v. Arizona56 suggesting a broad and powerful right to coun-
sel from the time of police interrogation through the appellate 
review stage. In In re Gault,57 the Supreme Court demonstrated 
that it would not limit a broad right to counsel to criminal cases 
and provided for a right to counsel in juvenile adjudications. 
Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 requiring 
federal district courts to adopt a local plan for furnishing coun-
sel to indigent defendants,58 and many states that had not al-
ready done so followed suit with the creation of indigent de-
fense delivery systems.59 
But with the war on drugs came the proliferation of crimi-
nal offenses and draconian penalties and burgeoning state 
criminal dockets.60 The incorporation of defendants’ criminal 
 
 51. See Celler, supra note 48, 701–11 (discussing these proposals). 
 52. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth 
Amendment); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating the right to pub-
lic trial). 
 53. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
 54. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 55. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 57. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 58. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 62 Stat. 684 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006)). 
 59. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, 
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 67 (14th ed. 2015) (describing the development of 
state public defender offices). 
 60. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 536 (2001) (describing the growth in criminal prosecution 
rates in the 1970s). 
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procedure rights within the Fourteenth Amendment threatened 
to make large numbers of prosecutions on that swelled docket 
more difficult and time-consuming for courts and prosecutors 
than they would have been before—especially if the defendants 
had decent lawyers. And, of course, the economic slowdown 
that followed the long boom of the 1950s and 60s meant that 
jurisdictions had fewer resources to expend on these matters. 
As a result, we have seen a steady and steep retreat from many 
of the principles and ideals advocated for in that important 
1961 symposium. Today’s right to counsel is a mere shadow of 
what the symposium authors envisioned.61  
But hope is not lost. As was true in 1961, there is once 
again a feeling that change is coming. Countless reports docu-
ment excessive defender caseloads, a lack of independence, and 
blatant violations of the constitutional right to counsel across 
jurisdictions and make recommendations for improvement.62 
Many states have developed bipartisan Indigent Defense 
Commissions to investigate best practices and implement more 
effective and efficient delivery systems.63 Legislators have con-
vened working groups and have proposed legislation to address 
the crisis.64 President Obama created the Office for Access to 
Justice, an initiative designed to analyze and think about how 
to improve indigent defense delivery systems.65 Symposia, much 
like the one this Article commemorates, abound detailing the 
problems with indigent defense delivery systems and recom-
mending potential solutions.66  
I do not mean to suggest that we are on the verge of the 
next Gideon v. Wainwright. In fact, I highly doubt that any-
 
 61. Countless scholars have lamented these developments. See sources 
collected supra note 46. 
 62. See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39; JUSTICE DENIED, 
supra note 32. 
 63. See INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 20; Terry Brooks & 
Shubhangi Deoras, State Commissions Project in Review, CRIM. JUST., Sum-
mer 2001, at 48 (describing commissions in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Neva-
da, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont); Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon 
by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice in Indigent De-
fense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325 (2015) (describing the work of commissions 
in North Carolina, Texas, and New York).  
 64. See, e.g., National Center for the Right to Counsel Act, H.R. 2063, 
114th Cong. (2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2063. 
 65. Ari Shapiro, Justice Dept. To Launch Indigent Defense Program, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story 
.php?storyId=124094017 (discussing the launch of the office). 
 66. See sources collected supra note 46. 
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thing quite as revolutionary as Gideon is on the horizon. But I 
do believe that some advances are possible in the current politi-
cal climate. Rather than attempt to offer a silver bullet that 
doesn’t exist, I want to offer a starting point. That starting 
point is a focus on culture. Moreover, it is a focus on culture as 
a structural problem. If we can improve some of the structures, 
we can improve some of the culture, thus raising the proportion 
of criminal defenders who defy the difficulty of their role and 
succeed in delivering zealous, client-centered advocacy. Chang-
ing culture sounds like an immensely difficult task, but recog-
nizing the ways that culture flows from structure points the 
way to practical measures that can have important structural 
effects. And in suggesting some of these measures, I am draw-
ing on the experience of model defender agencies around the 
country. There are a number of excellent public defender agen-
cies that have managed to withstand the pressures described 
above and do provide zealous, client-centered advocacy for indi-
gent defendants, and we can draw lessons from what they have 
achieved with structural conditions more favorable than those 
in which too many other defenders operate.67 
In Part I, I will describe the ways in which today’s right-to-
counsel challenges are similar to and different from those that 
faced the writers of the 1961 symposium. I will also explain in 
more detail why the structural conditions of criminal defense 
work to create (and, to some extent, always have created) a cul-
tural problem in indigent defense delivery systems across the 
country. In Part II, I will discuss why I believe that we are, 
once again, facing a moment for potential reform, albeit reform 
that is different in scope and kind from that which was possible 
in the 1960s. Finally, in Part III, I will explore how a focus on 
improving the culture of indigent defense delivery systems 
through structural change can and should infuse current re-
form proposals and inform change going forward. 
 
 67. I want to make it clear from the start that I am not here to disparage 
or indict public defenders. I was a trial and appellate defender before I became 
a law professor, and I have nothing but respect for defenders and the work 
that they do. In a number of offices around the country, defenders work in 
healthy and supportive environments that allow them to do their jobs effec-
tively. However, defenders are not adequately supported in many jurisdic-
tions, because the very structure of indigent defense delivery sets attorneys up 
for failure and creates a problematic indigent defense culture as a result. See 
infra Part I. My hope is that we can learn from the model defender offices and 
incorporate structural changes into struggling indigent defense delivery sys-
tems that will promote a culture of zealous advocacy and support the work 
that indigent defense attorneys do. 
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I.  TODAY VERSUS 1961: RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL 
CHALLENGES AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS   
In many respects, we live in a different world from the 
world that confronted Justice Douglas and the other writers in 
the 1961 symposium. Back then, an indigent defendant in a 
state criminal court was only constitutionally entitled to the 
assistance of counsel if he could show that his case involved 
special circumstances that required the “guiding hand of coun-
sel.”68 Alleged misdemeanants almost never had appointed 
counsel, and many juveniles were imprisoned without ever con-
sulting an attorney.69 Many states viewed the provision of indi-
gent defense representation as a matter of charity and relied 
wholly on volunteer lawyers to perform this work.70 And there 
were few standards available to describe what effective defense 
representation would look like.71 
In contrast, now there is a constitutional right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial and on the first appeal as of 
right for any defendant facing felony charges or misdemeanor 
charges that result in actual imprisonment.72 Juveniles also 
have a constitutional right to counsel in adjudication proceed-
ings.73 The federal government and the vast majority of states 
rely primarily on government-funded indigent defense delivery 
systems rather than simply volunteer lawyers.74 And there is a 
plethora of professional standards now to guide defense law-
yers and explain what it means to provide effective representa-
tion.75 
Although there are many important ways in which indi-
gent defense has changed in the last fifty years, many things 
 
 68. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 69. See Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 22 (2016) 
(noting that, before Gideon, “only a handful of states provided counsel in 
nonfelony cases”). 
 70. Id. at 38; Pollock, supra note 49, at 744 (describing “[t]he traditional 
philosophy that legal aid is a charity”). 
 71. See Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next Fifty Years 
of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1316 (2013) 
(noting that the first ABA Standards on Criminal Justice were not released 
until 1968). 
 72. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (felony trial right); Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (first appeal); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 
367 (1979) (misdemeanor trial right for offenses that result in imprisonment). 
 73. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 74. See INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 20 (describing indigent 
defense delivery systems). 
 75. See Drinan, supra note 71, at 1316–19 (describing these standards).  
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remain the same. Indigent defense organizations, to the extent 
that they exist, are still insufficiently funded.76 Defenders still 
face overwhelming caseloads and are, as a result, unable to 
give sufficient attention to individual cases.77 Defenders contin-
ue to be viewed as villains, and many clients continue to be dis-
satisfied with the quality of representation that they receive.78  
Indigent defense delivery systems may look somewhat dif-
ferent today than they did in 1961, but the culture-of-
indifference problems that have always plagued the system 
remain. Cultural problems have many sources. Here, I want to 
point out a few problems in the culture of indigent defense de-
livery systems whose sources are structural. These structural 
problems concern the sources of funding, a lack of independ-
ence, attorney isolation, inadequate training, and inadequate 
oversight. To be clear, these are not the only sources of the cul-
ture of indifference in criminal defense, much less the only se-
rious problems with the system of representation for the indi-
gent. But in the hopes of pointing out a thematic way in which 
criminal defense can improve, my present focus is on this set of 
structural factors that too often shape the professional culture. 
These structural problems come from different sources and 
affect indigent defense culture in different ways. For example, 
if a public defender office fails to train its line attorneys, that 
decision has immediate and direct effects on office culture. In 
contrast, if a state opts to use appointed counsel in lieu of pub-
lic defenders when structuring its indigent defense delivery 
system, the downstream effects on culture are more indirect. In 
both situations, however, the structural decision (whether in-
ternal to a defender system or externally imposed on a defender 
system) helps to shape the culture of the resulting indigent de-
fense delivery system.  
A. FUNDING SOURCES 
The largest funding problem in indigent defense delivery 
systems is, quite simply, that not enough money is allocated to 
indigent defense. This problem is hardly new.79 Experts have 
been calling for increases in indigent defense funding for dec-
 
 76. See sources collected supra note 62. 
 77. See sources collected supra note 62. 
 78. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 4, at 82 (describing the “special con-
tempt for those who represent indigent clients charged with crimes”). 
 79. See Pollock, supra note 49, at 751 (describing fiscal constraints). 
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ades.80 And severe underfunding certainly contributes to the 
cultural problems that plague indigent defense delivery sys-
tems. Among other things, severe underfunding means too few 
lawyers for too many cases, and an attorney with a crushing 
caseload is compromised in his ability to zealously represent 
his clients in obvious ways. That said, the sheer amount of 
money earmarked for indigent defense is less a structural con-
sideration about the design of our indigent defense delivery 
systems than it is a policy choice about what proportion of soci-
ety’s wealth will be devoted to indigent defense. The currently 
prevailing policy choice to make very little money available has 
downstream cultural effects on indigent defense delivery sys-
tems, and better funding is accordingly imperative, as a great 
many commentators have noted.81  
My goal in this Article, however, is to describe ways to 
structure indigent defense delivery systems so as to improve 
the professional culture. So it is worth noticing that the magni-
tude of the funding for indigent defense is not the only im-
portant funding-related issue. It also matters how the funding 
that is provided is structured. For example, a state must choose 
whether to force counties to fund their own indigent defense de-
livery systems or to fund indigent defense at the state level. 
That structural choice about how to use the limited resources 
that a state has for indigent defense often has downstream cul-
tural effects. There are reasons for believing that county-
funded systems tend to create poorer defender culture than 
state-wide systems, particularly when resources are con-
strained—which is always the reality in indigent defense. 
Many states continue to make their county governments 
overwhelmingly responsible for paying the costs of indigent de-
fense representation.82 Pennsylvania requires its counties to 
 
 80. See Peter A. Joy, Unequal Assistance of Counsel, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 518, 531 (2015) (“Over thirty-five years ago, the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) advocated for a federally funded program to help state and local 
governments provide sufficient public defense services. Since then, there is no 
sign that the federal government will help or that state and local governments 
are ensuring adequate funding willingly.” (footnote omitted)). 
 81. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in 
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (“By 
every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the 
defense function for poor people is drastically underfinanced.”); Joy, supra 
note 80. 
 82. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 54–55; Andrew W. Goldsmith, The 
Bill for Rights: State and Local Financing of Public Education and Indigent 
Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89, 92 (2005). 
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cover the entire cost.83 In seventeen other states, the state 
shifts the burden of more than half of the funding to individual 
counties.84 Structurally, this lack of state funding means that 
financial resources cannot be spread across the state. And as I 
will explain, this creation of separate county-based silos for in-
digent defense funding compromises the quality and ultimately 
the culture of defense representation.  
In county-funded systems, urban counties with high crime 
rates are overwhelmed by the expense of indigent defense. Of-
ten, these counties have large indigent populations and, with-
out significant state support, simply cannot raise enough mon-
ey to support public defender systems. Sometimes, the resource 
constraints at the county level are so severe that trial courts 
have to conscript unwilling and inexperienced attorneys to rep-
resent indigent criminal defendants.85 These lawyers obviously 
have no financial incentive to provide zealous, client-centered 
advocacy and no criminal defense experience or training that 
would enable them to do so.  
Some urban counties resort to flat-fee contract systems, 
under which assigned attorneys are paid flat fees for represent-
ing however many indigent cases are on the courts’ dockets.86 
These fees tend to be remarkably low, and they create perverse 
incentives for attorneys defending the indigent—incentives 
that discourage effective representation and that corrode the 
culture of indigent defense.87 
Consider, for example, the “house counsel” system in 
Wayne County, Michigan—the county where Detroit is locat-
ed.88 Michigan is one of the states where each individual county 
 
 83. See HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., SPANGENBURG PROJECT, STATE, COUN-
TY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 
2008 5 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam 
.pdf [hereinafter STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL]. A 2009 report suggests that 
Utah also relies solely on its counties to provide indigent defense. See JUSTICE 
DENIED, supra note 32, at 54. And a reference to a 2012 study suggests that 
California delegates all funding responsibility to its counties. See Bright & 
Sanneh, supra note 2, at 2165 n.74. 
 84. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 54 (listing states); STATE, COUNTY 
AND LOCAL, supra note 83 (listing states). 
 85. See Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 513 n.30 (collecting cases). 
 86. See id. at 514–15 (describing these systems). 
 87. Id. 
 88. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM, SPEED 
& SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 27 (2008), http:// 
  
1786 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1769 
 
is expected to fund the majority of its indigent defense delivery 
system.89 The 36th District Court in Detroit processes 600,000 
cases per year, and ninety percent of those cases involve indi-
gent defendants.90 Wayne County cannot afford to adequately 
fund the defense of 540,000 cases. After all, its principal city, 
Detroit, filed for bankruptcy in 2013.91 So what does the county 
do? Defendants accused of low-level misdemeanors are appoint-
ed “house counsel” to represent them. Any attorney who is will-
ing to sit through nine hours of training can apply to be “house 
counsel” in a courtroom for a half-day and receive a $150 flat 
fee to handle all of the cases on the docket.92 The effects on de-
fender culture are fairly obvious. House counsel do not meet 
their clients in advance; they rarely file any motions; and they 
almost never go to trial.93 The sooner they handle their cases, 
the sooner they get their fee and go home. This, in turn, leads 
to a culture of devaluing clients and not zealously advocating 
for their rights. 
I went to the 36th District Courthouse with two other pub-
lic defenders to observe a trial courtroom. Among the three of 
us, we had more than twenty years of trial-level public defend-
er experience in a half dozen different jurisdictions. We sat in 
that courtroom and watched as an attorney, who we all thought 
was the prosecutor, spoke to defendants, offered them deals, 
and pleaded them out. It took the three of us more than two 
hours to figure out that the attorney we were watching was not 
the prosecutor; she was house counsel. There was no client-
centered advocacy. As far as we could tell, there was no advoca-
cy at all. It was just “meet-and-plead.”94 
Many overwhelmed counties have a bidding process under 
which the flat-fee contract to handle indigent defense cases is 
given to the lowest bidder.95 The predictable result is defense 
lawyers who carry very large caseloads for very little compen-
 
www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_report.pdf [hereinafter RACE TO THE 
BOTTOM]. 
 89. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 54. 
 90. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 88. 
 91. Reid Wilson & Michael A. Fletcher, Detroit Eligible for Bankruptcy 
Filing, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2013, at A1. 
 92. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 88. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Cf. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 31 (describing “meet-and-
plead” practices in other jurisdictions). 
 95. See Bright & Sanneh, supra note 2, at 2165–66 (describing some of 
these jurisdictions). 
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sation. Indeed, the compensation is too small for the lawyers to 
make their living doing indigent defense, so these contract law-
yers have to supplement their incomes with other work, which 
results in even less time for their indigent defense clients.96 
Given these financial incentives, it is not surprising that plea 
rates in the criminal justice system are higher than ever97 and 
that zealous, client-centered advocacy is often not possible.  
The structural problems associated with county-based 
funding are not limited to urban counties. Many rural, less 
populous counties simply cannot fund the overhead costs asso-
ciated with public defender systems. Instead, they rely on an 
assigned-counsel system under which assigned attorneys are 
paid an hourly rate.98 And precisely because many of these rural 
counties don’t have significant resources, they cannot compen-
sate attorneys at a fair market rate—at market rates, one com-
plex homicide case could deplete a poor county’s entire indigent 
defense budget.99 As a result, compensation for assigned attor-
neys is often as low as $40 or $50 per hour,100 and there are 
hard caps on how much an attorney can earn per case. These 
fee caps are shockingly low. As of 2007, the maximum fee for a 
non-capital felony was $1,250 in Illinois, $650 in New Mexico, 
and, in one Oklahoma county, just $500.101 If an attorney is paid 
$50 per hour and has a $500 cap, she has no financial incentive 
to spend more than ten hours on a felony case. That hardly in-
centivizes her to go to trial or do significant legal research or 
investigation. Financially, she is better off pleading out a case, 
getting her fee, and then getting a new client. 
Given the low fees routinely paid to assigned counsel to 
handle indigent defense cases, many of the lawyers who volun-
 
 96. See Rapping, supra note 4, at 189 (explaining how lawyers have need-
ed to supplement). 
 97. See M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole J. Powell, Valuing Gideon’s 
Gold: How Much Justice Can We Afford?, 122 YALE L.J. 2358, 2365 (2013) 
(“[T]he percentage of felonies that proceed to trial in nine states fell to 2.3% in 
2009, from 8% in 1976” (internal citation marks omitted)); David E. Patton, 
Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578, 2581 
(2013) (“In 1963, nearly 15% of all federal defendants went to trial; in 2010, 
the figure was 2.7%.”). 
 98. See Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 514–15 (describing these systems). 
 99. For example, public defenders in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, 
had one high-profile murder case involving a deaf person eat up more than a 
third of their annual budget for interpreters. Jill Callison, Murder Cases 
Stress Public Defender Staff, Budget, ARGUSLEADER, Apr. 8, 2007, at 1A.  
 100. DESILETS ET AL., supra note 25.  
 101. Id. at 9, 15–16. 
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teer are less experienced attorneys who do not otherwise have 
the ability to attract business.102 “House counsel” in Detroit, for 
example, do not have to have any criminal defense experi-
ence.103 They just have to sit through nine hours of “training” 
devoted only to “the mechanics of the docket.”104 Given their 
lack of experience and the absence of any substantive training, 
it is not surprising that house counsel do not provide zealous 
advocacy. 
Before Gideon was decided, scholars and practitioners writ-
ing in the pages of this law review understood that experienced, 
public defenders would be necessary if the right to counsel was 
to have meaning. As Judge Leon Thomas David wrote: 
[T]here is a premium upon detailed knowledge of the statutes and up-
on adequate experience with criminal procedure . . . . This involves far 
more than the statutes and the case law. It frequently involves 
knowledge of police operating procedures; knowledge of police record 
systems; familiarity with the work of the local crime laboratories; and 
acquaintanceship with the local experts in such things as narcotics, 
ballistics, arson, forensic chemistry, handwriting, toxicology and crim-
inal identification. This arsenal of information is available through a 
specialized public or voluntary defender, and a private practitioner 
entering a criminal case may be unfamiliar with it.105  
Yet, fifty-five years later, states still rely on the services of 
many inexperienced, non-criminal lawyers to satisfy their obli-
gations to provide indigent defense representation. 
To a considerable extent, the preceding problems flow from 
the simple fact that so little money is allocated to indigent de-
fense. But the choice to fund at the county level exacerbates the 
problem. By requiring each county to handle the overhead costs 
of any public defender system that it might operate, county-
based funding effectively guarantees that a great many coun-
ties will use assigned-counsel systems like the ones described 
above. And even in counties that are able to afford public de-
fender offices, the reliance on county funds often means that 
the income stream for the office is not as stable as it is in state-
funded systems. In New Orleans, for example, the public de-
fender’s budget relied on traffic ticket revenue.106 If the police 
 
 102. See Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 515 (noting that being paid below 
market rates is attractive to “attorneys who are inexperienced or not blessed 
with a flourishing practice”). 
 103. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 88. 
 104. Id. 
 105. David, supra note 23, at 763; see also Pollock, supra note 49, at 745 
(“[T]he Defender is a specialist in the trial of criminal cases . . . .”). 
 106. Rapping, supra note 4, at 183–84. 
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did not issue enough tickets in a given month, there would be 
no money for indigent defense experts. If experts are not avail-
able for months at a time, many lawyers will be conditioned not 
to ask for them. And if lawyers have to worry constantly that 
asking for resources in one case will undermine their ability to 
get them in a later case, they will be forced to think about tri-
aging their requests rather than zealously fighting for all of 
their clients. In short, a lack of stability undermines a culture 
of vigorous advocacy. And state-funded systems have the ability 
to spread resources across the state and strategically plan for 
and handle shortfalls in ways that counties cannot.  
B.  LACK OF INDEPENDENCE 
Experts in attendance at the 1961 Right to Counsel sympo-
sium recognized the importance of having independent defend-
ers who are not beholden to the political will of the electorate or 
the docket-control needs of the judges before whom they ap-
pear. As one trial judge from California wrote, “[n]o adequate 
organization can be established and function where its sup-
port—in money and manpower—fluctuates with the interests 
and objectives of the changing officers of a national, state, or 
local bar association.”107 The then-Chairman of the House Judi-
ciary Committee agreed that independence was essential and 
noted that “public defenders ought not to be appointed by the 
district court before which it would be their duty to practice.”108  
Fifty-five years later, independence problems persist. As 
former Attorney General Eric Holder has explained, “many 
public defender offices have insufficient independence or over-
sight to ensure that the lawyers are effectively representing the 
interests of the accused. In some places judges assign cases to 
lawyers, which can influence the representation the lawyers 
provide.”109 Consider again the house counsel system in Detroit. 
The 36th District Court’s own plan indicates that “[a]ttorneys 
seeking assignments are encouraged to meet with the judge or 
clerk to submit their business card or letter indicating their in-
 
 107. See David, supra note 23, at 761. 
 108. See Celler, supra note 48, at 712. A defender in Philadelphia agreed 
that it is a problem if “the Defender is susceptible to political manipulation 
and domination by the court.” See Pollock, supra note 49, at 748. 
 109. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Brennan Legacy Awards 
Dinner, Brennan Center for Justice (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.brennancenter 
.org/analysis/attorney-general-eric-holder-indigent-defense-reform [hereinafter 
Holder Remarks]. 
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tent.”110 Judges interview and pick the attorneys they want to 
be house counsel in their courthouses, and judges have an in-
terest in getting through their dockets. It is perhaps not sur-
prising that house counsel tend not to provide zealous advoca-
cy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that what some house counsel 
tend to provide are financial contributions to the judges’ cam-
paign funds.111 
The problem is not limited to Michigan. A 2006 statewide 
survey of judges in Nebraska revealed that some judges “have 
‘paid attorneys back’ for too many trials or other offenses by not 
appointing them again.”112 And even after Texas adopted a 
number of reforms to improve its indigent defense delivery sys-
tem, judges are still tasked with appointing and approving the 
compensation of defense counsel,113 and claims that judges rou-
tinely appoint those with whom they have personal relation-
ships persist.114 
Independence problems also exist when elected legislative 
or executive officials have too much control over public defend-
er offices. In Onondaga County, New York, for example, the Le-
gal Aid Society lost a contract to handle city court cases after 
the Director was questioned by a legislative committee about 
why she was filing motions and making discovery requests in-
stead of pleading cases at arraignment.115 Similarly, the Chief 
Public Defender in Maryland was fired in 2009 for being un-
willing to scale back statewide operations that encouraged too 
much zealous representation after the Board of Trustees that 
governs that indigent defense system—a board that consisted 
primarily of the Governor’s appointees—pushed for cuts.116  
 
 110. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 88. 
 111. Id. Michigan is one of many states with elected judiciaries. See AM. 
BAR ASS’N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES, 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact_sheet.pdf, (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).  
 112. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 84 (discussing the study); Holder 
Remarks, supra note 109 (same). 
 113. Backus & Marcus, supra note 81, at 1104–05. 
 114. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 82–83; see also Bellware, supra 
note 28 (describing how defense attorneys who file a lot of motions or are 
“picky during jury selection” will have their indigent defense contracts termi-
nated). 
 115. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 81. 
 116. Bykowicz & Bishop, supra note 33; see also Brief for Honorable Nor-
man S. Fletcher et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant, Georgia Pub. 
Def. Standards Council v. Buchanan, 679 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. 2009) (No. 
S09A0440), 2009 WL 3342659, at *8–14 (describing how Georgia passed legis-
lation in 2007 that transferred control over the Georgia Public Defender 
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When defenders have to fear losing their jobs or not getting 
future appointments or contracts as a consequence of zealous 
advocacy, the implications for defender culture are clear. De-
fenders either conform to what the judges, legislatures, and ex-
ecutive officials want or they are out. And too often what those 
officials want is not zealous, client-centered advocacy but effi-
cient processing of cases.  
Structural choices at a micro-level can also adversely affect 
defender independence and, in turn, defender culture. For ex-
ample, some indigent defense delivery systems are structured 
such that one defense attorney is assigned to one courtroom for 
an extended period of time. Studies suggest that defenders who 
are assigned to one courtroom develop a desire to please that 
one judge.117 It becomes much harder for the attorney to disa-
gree with the judge or fight against the way things are done in 
that courtroom, because the attorney does not want to upset 
the judge just before bringing another client before him. Thus, 
a courthouse with a one attorney per courtroom system is 
structurally harmful to creating an independent, zealous, cli-
ent-centered defense culture. 
C. ATTORNEY ISOLATION 
One of the most important structural aspects of any work-
place is whether its employees work alone or as part of a group. 
In many fields, there are advantages and disadvantages to both 
arrangements. In the criminal-defense context, though, the ad-
vantages are decidedly on the side of the group structure. De-
fenders need to work together in communities for the emotional 
support and motivation that it provides, the expertise and pro-
fessional assistance that it brings, and the political power that 
comes from the strength of their combined impact. 
Defending the indigent means fighting uphill pretty much 
all the time, facing scorn and annoyance pretty much all the 
time, and losing often. It’s hard to stay committed under those 
circumstances, and it’s yet harder to do alone. It is incredibly 
difficult for a human being to face the avalanche of hostility 
that defenders face day after day and withstand the immense 
pressure to process cases through the system. Many attorneys 
in model public defender offices freely admit that one thing 
 
Standards Council to the executive branch and arguing that the system cre-
ates a conflict of interest that undermines the Georgia Public Defender Stand-
ards Council’s independence). 
 117. See Rapping, supra note 4, at 192 n.60 (collecting studies). 
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that emboldens them and helps them keep fighting for their 
clients is the knowledge that their offices and their fellow de-
fenders have their backs.118 When they have a success in court, 
they have teammates who will reinforce their sense of having 
done a good thing in the face of the annoyed reactions they are 
likely to get from other players in the system. And when they 
put in their best efforts and their clients are convicted anyway, 
their teammates pick them up, dust them off, and send them 
back into the game fighting. 
In addition to the emotional support and motivation that a 
group structure provides, defenders also benefit from working 
together in communities because their ability to learn from one 
another and pool their combined intellectual resources raises 
the level of representation that each of them is able to pro-
vide.119 When a defender office has regular meetings where at-
torneys can discuss difficult cases and brainstorm legal strate-
gies, public defenders can learn from the experience and 
expertise of their colleagues. The access to expertise and ability 
to pool intellectual resources is critical for underfunded defend-
er systems. Defender offices can create databases with sample 
motions and briefs that allow attorneys to pool resources and 
save precious time by not having to reinvent the wheel each 
time a recurring issue arises.120 Discussions during strategy 
sessions and informal conversations by the water fountain pro-
vide mentoring and support that can help attorneys spot im-
 
 118. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 4, at 92–93 (discussing the importance 
of the culture at the D.C. Public Defender Service). 
 119. For this reason, some public defender offices have moved toward a 
team approach to indigent defense representation. They organize their attor-
neys into teams, which typically consist of a lawyer, an investigator, and a le-
gal assistant. See, e.g., Toby Fey, Legal Assistants: Humanizing the Criminal 
Justice Process, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, http://www.nlada.org/  
Defender/Defender_NDLI/Defender_NDLI_Success/Portland (last visited Apr. 
4, 2016). Offices adopting holistic approaches to indigent defense representa-
tion work in teams of attorneys, social workers, mental health experts, immi-
gration experts, and other experts to help clients get out of the system. See, 
e.g., ROBIN G. STEINBERG, BEYOND LAWYERING 5–8, https://www.nycourts.gov/ 
ip/partnersinjustice/Beyond-Lawyering.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).  
 120. See JOEL M. SCHUMM, NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE 
SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED 21–22 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/  
content/dam/aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_national_indigent_defense_ 
reform.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter THE SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED] (ex-
plaining how the Michigan State Appellate Defender Office created a database 
for attorneys to pool resources). 
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portant legal issues in their cases and encourage more zealous 
and effective advocacy.121 
Group structure is also important because there is strength 
in numbers. When a public defender office has a policy of not 
taking cases once it reaches a certain caseload, line attorneys 
can enforce the policy. Even if the trial judge holds one attorney 
in contempt for refusing to take on yet another case, the next 
line attorney will do the same thing. Individual attorneys do 
not have that kind of power, because no individual attorney is a 
necessary player in ninety percent of a court’s docket. And 
when a public defender office appeals the trial court’s refusal to 
honor its caseload limits, the appellate courts will often listen. 
For example, after the Missouri Public Defender Commis-
sion developed caseload standards for the state, the state Pub-
lic Defender tried to enforce a limit on the number of cases it 
would take in accordance with those standards.122 When the 
trial courts refused to honor the caseload limits and continued 
to appoint the Public Defender Office to new cases, the Public 
Defender refused and took its case up to the Missouri Supreme 
Court. That court upheld both the legitimacy of the caseload 
standards and the public defender’s authority to refuse to take 
on additional cases.123  
Similarly, in Miami, Florida, the public defender filed mo-
tions in a number of cases seeking to avoid future appoint-
ments, noting that its excessive caseload meant that it could 
not ethically represent additional defendants and to require it 
to do so would present a conflict of interest.124 The Supreme 
Court of Florida agreed that the public defender should be 
permitted to refuse additional cases if it could show that its ex-
cessive caseload created a substantial risk that the representa-
tion of one or more clients will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.125  
 
 121. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 93 (discussing how attorneys at the Pub-
lic Defender Service in Washington, D.C. would discuss their cases each day 
“at lunch meetings, during coffee breaks, and during informal social gather-
ings at the end of the day,” which would lead to the development of “creative 
arguments that turned out to be persuasive the following day in court”). 
 122. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 597 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 123. Id. at 612. 
 124. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 
279 (Fla. 2013). 
 125. Id.; see also Gene Johnson, State High Court Limits Public-Defender 
Caseloads, SEATTLE TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/  
seattle-news/state-high-court-limits-public-defender-caseloads (describing 
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Public defender offices also have lobbying and negotiating 
power that assigned counsel do not. It might not be worth it for 
a prosecutor to sit down and negotiate the contours of a discov-
ery disclosure policy at the demand of one assigned attorney, 
but the prosecutor might be willing to talk to the head of a pub-
lic defender office because the public defender office represents 
the vast majority of clients and has power to interfere more 
with the prosecutor’s operations. 
For all of these reasons, the group structure of public de-
fender offices tends to create a culture of more zealous defense 
advocacy. Lawyers in assigned-counsel systems rarely have a 
sense of community with their fellow defenders that enables 
them to stand up to the pressures of the system over time. To 
be clear, I don’t mean to suggest that an assigned attorney 
cannot zealously fight for her clients. I know some who do. But 
an indigent defense delivery system structured around sole 
practitioners or loosely affiliated groups of lawyers is not a sys-
tem that lends itself to a culture of vigorous defense advocacy.  
Empirical studies confirm that public defenders perform 
better for their clients than court-appointed lawyers. In Phila-
delphia, for example, one in five homicide defendants is ran-
domly assigned to a public defender, and the other four get 
court-appointed private attorneys. Researchers at the RAND 
Corporation used this random assignment to study murder case 
outcomes and found that, “compared to appointed counsel, pub-
lic defenders in Philadelphia reduce their clients’ murder con-
viction rate by 19% and lower the probability that their clients 
receive . . . life sentences by 62%.”126 Public defenders reduce 
the overall expected time served in prison by 24%. The re-
searchers interviewed judges, public defenders, and appointed 
defense attorneys and offered the following explanation for 
their results: “We find that, in general, appointed counsel have 
comparatively few resources, face more difficult incentives, and 
are more isolated than public defenders. The extremely low 
[pay] reduces the pool of attorneys willing to take the appoint-
ments and makes extensive preparation economically undesir-
 
caseload limits imposed by the Washington Supreme Court); Jim Seckler, 
Judge Allows Public Defender To Withdraw from 39 Felony Cases, MOHAVE 
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.mohavedailynews.com/news/local/ 
judge-allows-public-defender-to-withdraw-from-felony-cases/article_d877bab3 
-2ba7-5901-a459-85a970fb6873.html (describing one superior court judge in 
Mohave County, Arizona, who permitted the public defender’s office to with-
draw from thirty-nine felony criminal cases due to its caseload). 
 126. Anderson & Heaton, supra note 28, at 154. 
  
2016] CULTURE AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 1795 
 
able.”127 An analysis of Bureau of Justice Statistics suggests 
that this effect is not limited to murder cases or to Philadelph-
ia.128  
This is not to say that the problem of attorney isolation 
does not exist at all in public defender systems. Many public 
defender systems do not sufficiently take advantage of their 
group structure to provide support that encourages zealous ad-
vocacy. They don’t have regular brainstorming sessions. They 
don’t use their collective power to try to raise the level of repre-
sentation in their jurisdiction. In many such offices, the attor-
neys may feel that the lack of sufficient time to handle over-
whelming caseloads makes office meetings and strategy 
sessions seem like impossible luxuries. But that view is short-
sighted. In the slightly longer run, investing in the benefits of 
group structure can have important positive effects on defender 
culture. 
D. INADEQUATE TRAINING 
In 1961, there was little training about how to effectively 
or zealously represent indigent criminal defendants. Courts 
routinely pressed young, inexperienced lawyers into service 
representing indigent clients.129 Elite law schools did not pre-
sent indigent defense as a viable career option, so there was no 
education in law school about how to be a defender.130 Because 
most defender jobs carried either no salary or an incredibly low 
 
 127. Id. at 188. 
 128. See THOMAS H. COHEN, WHO’S BETTER AT DEFENDING CRIMINALS? 
DOES TYPE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY MATTER IN TERMS OF PRODUCING FAVOR-
ABLE CASE OUTCOMES 48 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1876474; see also 
Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense 
Counsel 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13187 (analyzing the federal indigent defense 
system and concluding that, “[i]t appears that public defenders outperform 
CJA panel attorneys in all outcomes that were considered”). 
 129. See Ellery E. Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 
MINN. L. REV. 715, 719, 725 (1961) (describing how judges “would appoint an 
attorney who happened to be in the courtroom” and the attorney would then 
“tak[e] the accused to a corner to talk to him for five minutes, return[], and 
enter[] a plea of guilty”); David, supra note 23, at 756–57 (“I have seen the 
judge scan the courtroom and summon to the indigent’s defense the first 
young lawyer whom he recognized that morning. I have seen another reach for 
a list of names he kept under the corner of his blotter; the names were those of 
young lawyers who had requested that they be assigned for the experience.”). 
 130. See Mayeux, supra note 69, at 35 (“[E]lite law schools neither expected 
nor encouraged their students to pursue criminal defense as a permanent ca-
reer.”). 
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salary, the best-trained lawyers did not enter this line of 
work.131  
Much is different today, but the failure to train entry-level 
defenders adequately persists.132 Elite law schools now have 
public service offices that encourage and help students inter-
ested in pursuing careers in public interest law,133 and the clini-
cal offerings at most law schools include clinics for law students 
interested in careers in indigent defense. Many public defender 
offices offer salaried positions, and more top law students are 
drawn to public service careers. Despite these advances, most 
entry-level public defenders still learn how to do their job on 
the job.134 To be sure, something similar could be said about en-
try-level lawyers in many areas of legal practice, at that broad 
level of generality. Private-firm lawyers learn how to be pri-
vate-firm lawyers in substantial part at the firm, rather than 
arriving fully trained. But it would be a mistake to think that 
the circumstances are so similar. An entry-level lawyer at a 
private firm is not, in her first month, thrown unsupervised in-
to a meeting with a client, having been told that she is the sole 
attorney on the case and that she must, right away, handle the 
litigation of some matter on which the client’s interests vitally 
depend. In contrast, a new public defender is often put right in-
to the courtroom (sometimes multiple courtrooms at a time) 
with a docket full of clients. In a good office, new public defend-
ers get a few weeks of training first.135 But even that is not as 
common as it should be.  
Anyone who has been in a courtroom knows that it is an 
environment filled with rules and established procedures—
 
 131. Cuff, supra note 129, at 723 (“Reputable and busy lawyers generally 
find it impractical to volunteer their services for unproductive and 
unremunerative criminal work.”); see also Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate 
and the Expert—Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 
803, 840 (1961) (“The highest minded and the most competent are not, as a 
group, the lawyers most attracted to criminal work.”).  
 132. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 39–40 (describing the lack of 
training for misdemeanor attorneys). 
 133. See, e.g., Public Interest, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., https://www.law 
.umich.edu/careers/pubintcomm/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) 
(describing the University of Michigan Law School’s Public Interest pro-
grams). 
 134. Peng, supra note 7 (describing the experience of one public defender 
who noted that “the week I passed the bar in 2013, I began representing peo-
ple facing mandatory life sentences on felony charges”). 
 135. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 40–41 (describing model training 
programs in Philadelphia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C.). 
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everything from where people sit to when they are permitted to 
talk is a matter of routine practice. These routines have been 
established by the local court rules or the trial judges with the 
goal of efficiently processing cases through the system. When 
new attorneys are placed in this regimented environment, 
many of them do the most rational thing: they look around and 
follow the lead of the more seasoned attorneys in the court-
room. Sit where they sit. Argue when they argue. To figure out 
what arguments to make during sentencing hearings, watch a 
few and follow suit. This mimicry replicates the existing quality 
of indigent defense representation in the jurisdiction.136 When 
that quality is low, as is too often the case (because, of course, 
the more senior lawyers also did not get adequate training),137 
the failure to train entry-level attorneys or teach them that 
something could be done differently often means that entering 
lawyers become new cogs in the machine that processes people 
on their way to prison.138 
When an idealistic, energetic new lawyer comes and tries 
to elevate the level of practice in a jurisdiction, she is often im-
mediately shut down—not just by the prosecutor but by the 
judge. “That is not the way we do things here.” “Sit down, coun-
selor.” “Save that argument for your appeal.” Many attorneys 
are threatened with contempt or actually jailed for trying to 
zealously represent their clients.139 The message to the new at-
torney is clear: we have a way of doing things here, and you 
can’t rock the boat.  
Without training and support, the line attorney won’t have 
strategies for figuring out how to navigate this hostile envi-
ronment. What should she do? Keep fighting for what she 
thinks is right even when it falls on deaf ears and alienates her 
from court personnel in ways that might wind up hurting her 
clients? Or play along, compromise with the culture, and just 
 
 136. See Rapping, supra note 4, at 190–91. 
 137. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the 
Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 221 (2004) (“[Y]ear after 
year, in study after study, observers find remarkably poor defense lawyer-
ing.”). 
 138. See Steve Hanlon, Needed a Cultural Revolution, 39 HUM. RTS. 2 
(2013) (“[T]he principal function of all of the players in the criminal justice 
system . . . is to serve as a facilitator for the mass overincarceration of a nation 
that now incarcerates a greater proportion of its population than any other 
nation in the world.”). 
 139. See Rapping, supra note 4, at 196–97; see also State v. Jones, No. 
2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008). 
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try to do what she can in small ways? For many young, idealis-
tic lawyers, the latter choice quickly seems like the only realis-
tic option. Their idealism is beaten out of them, and they wind 
up indifferent or depressed.140  
With a different kind of training, accepting the existing 
culture might not seem like the only realistic option. There are 
ways to fight against a bad culture and elevate the level of 
practice in a jurisdiction. But these courses of action are not 
easy, and they may not be intuitive, and they are hard to pur-
sue without guidance and support—and a particular kind of 
training.  
Lawyers don’t typically get the relevant training in law 
school, and it is different in kind from the training that entry-
level defenders who are lucky enough to get some training often 
do receive. Some offices train incoming lawyers in standard 
court practices, client interviews, substantive legal issues, and 
trial advocacy skills. But too many offices don’t teach lawyers 
about how to stand up against the avalanche when it comes or 
what strategies to use to fight against the pressure to move 
things along quickly—when to use smaller and more subtle 
moves and when to pull in bigger guns, what those moves look 
like, when to stand your ground and when to change direction 
and try something else. 
Moreover, far too many offices provide little to no training 
about how to develop good working relationships with indigent 
clients—how to make your clients feel understood without be-
ing patronizing, how to communicate effectively with clients 
whose backgrounds are different from yours, how to gain their 
trust when their life experiences have taught them not to trust, 
and how to make your clients feel like partners who have a 
voice in what happens in their cases. In some offices, the very 
structure of the office inhibits the development of a real attor-
ney-client relationship. For example, some public defender of-
fices have adopted horizontal representation systems under 
which attorneys are assigned to stages of the criminal process 
rather than clients.141 In a horizontal representation system, a 
 
 140. Cf. Ogletree, supra note 4, at 88 (explaining how, due to the rigors and 
challenges of the job, many public defenders “tell of losing their motivation to 
be a crusader because they have become jaded, disillusioned, or cynical about 
the work”). 
 141. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s 
Right to Counsel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1254–55 (2006) (describing hori-
zontal representation models). Horizontal representation permits attorneys to 
progress slowly through the trial process, becoming expert at each stage in the 
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client encounters a different lawyer each time he goes into 
court. That is no way to develop client-centered representation.  
Many indigent defendants feel ignored and confused be-
cause defense lawyers don’t communicate with them effectively. 
Not surprisingly, defenders who are not taught how to com-
municate effectively with their clients often fail to develop the 
important client relationships that are essential to providing 
client-centered representation. As a result, clients’ confusion, 
mistrust, and frustration color their experience of the system. 
Defenders themselves also experience high levels of anger and 
frustration. After all, defenders who never learn how to stand 
up to the pressure of the justice system often flounder when 
they try and wind up either giving up or burning out.  
E. INADEQUATE OVERSIGHT 
Too often, defenders’ performance is never evaluated.142 
There is no constructive feedback from, or substantive review 
by, a supervisor. Promotions are often dependent on length of 
time in the office rather than the quality of the attorney’s per-
formance, so there is no “need” to genuinely assess perfor-
mance.143 There are no bonuses available to reward zealous ad-
vocacy: defender offices don’t have funds to pay defense 
attorneys a fair salary, let alone give them extra. A good public 
defender office has informal ways of recognizing its zealous ad-
vocates, but often the attorneys are all so overworked that 
there is hardly time to notice.144  
For panel attorneys who do not work in public defender of-
fices, there is often no supervisor evaluation because there is no 
real supervisor at all. The official who coordinates appoint-
ments is often nothing more than that; she does not analyze or 
question the quality of the representation provided. And the lo-
cal bar associations do a terrible job of finding and removing 
 
process before moving on to the next phase, but they compromise client rela-
tionship building in the process. Id. at 1255. 
 142. See Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 40 (“[P]erformance reviews 
are non-existent.”). 
 143. See Carrie Leonetti, Painting the Roses Red: Confessions of a Recover-
ing Public Defender, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 371, 392 (2015) (describing “the 
common defender-office practice of promoting and remunerating lawyers sole-
ly on the basis of length of service”).  
 144. See Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 40 (describing one Florida 
public defender who said that there were two senior attorneys assigned to su-
pervise thirty misdemeanor attorneys in the office, and the two senior attor-
neys had their own felony caseloads). 
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ineffective attorneys. The lax judicial standard for judging the 
effectiveness of a trial attorney’s performance145 means that the 
judiciary has stood by for decades while sleeping lawyers, 
drunk lawyers, and lawyers who routinely violate their ethical 
duties to their clients continue to take on indigent defense cas-
es.146 This lack of oversight allows poor cultural norms to devel-
op unchecked. It is clearly part of the reason why we have a 
cultural problem in indigent defense representation.  
With county-based funding, a lack of independence, isolat-
ed attorneys, inadequate training, and no real oversight of at-
torney performance, it should come as no surprise that indigent 
defense delivery systems around the country are in crisis. Alt-
hough we have come a long way since Gideon, the very struc-
ture of indigent defense delivery systems in this country con-
tinues to create a culture of indifference. 
II.  A TIME FOR CHANGE   
As was true in 1961, there is reason to believe that change 
is coming to state criminal justice systems in general and indi-
gent defense delivery systems in particular. Legislators, execu-
tive officials, judges, and bar associations are expressing con-
cern about the indigent defense crisis, mass incarceration, 
overcriminalization, and policing, and are looking for ways to 
work together to reform the criminal justice system.147 The pub-
lic also seems more supportive of criminal justice reform than 
 
 145. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (requiring the 
defendant to show that his counsel performed unreasonably given prevailing 
norms of practice and that counsel’s errors were serious enough to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the case); id. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of coun-
sel’s performance must be highly deferential.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 
2676, 2679–80 (2013) (“As Senator Patrick Leahy has remarked, ‘Too often in-
dividuals facing the ultimate punishment are represented by lawyers who are 
drunk, sleeping, soon-to-be disbarred or just plain ineffective.’” (quoting 150 
CONG. REC. S11,613 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy))); see 
also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 78–79 (1999). For a discussion of how 
poor attorney performance norms can be incorporated into the Strickland 
standard itself, see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Lawyering to the Lowest Common 
Denominator: Strickland’s Potential for Incorporating Underfunded Norms in-
to Legal Doctrine, 5 FAULKNER L. REV. 199 (2014). 
 147. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the American Bar 
Association National Summit on Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www 
.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-american-bar 
-association-s-national-summit-indigent (discussing collaborative efforts and 
steps toward reform); see also infra notes 152–68. 
  
2016] CULTURE AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 1801 
 
in the past.148 No, we are not likely to see big, revolutionary, 
pro-defendant change. But at least some change is possible, and 
even likely.  
In the last fifteen years, governors, state supreme courts, 
and state legislatures have all played roles in creating more 
than a dozen new indigent defense oversight bodies in states 
across the country.149 Most of these bodies take the form of In-
digent Defense Commissions that are charged with overhauling 
the indigent defense delivery systems in the state. And many of 
them are currently taking bold and important strides, trying to 
improve indigent defense delivery systems.  
They have gotten some help from the American Bar Asso-
ciation’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent De-
fendants, which, in 2002, promulgated the Ten Principles of a 
Public Defense Delivery System in order to give policymakers 
restructuring indigent defense delivery systems “a practical 
guide” containing “the fundamental criteria necessary to design 
a system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, 
conflict-free legal representation” for the poor.150 In 2006, the 
ABA Ethics Committee issued Formal Opinion 06-441 saying 
that lawyers must move to withdraw and advise the court not 
to make any new appointments if they are unable to ethically 
represent more clients because of excessive caseloads.151 In 
2009, the ABA built on that opinion by adopting the Eight 
Guidelines of Indigent Defense Related to Excessive Case-
loads.152 Public defenders in Florida and Missouri who followed 
the ABA’s guidelines and refused to take on additional cases 
 
 148. See infra notes 169–70. 
 149. See INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 20 (describing state 
commissions); Backus & Marcus, supra note 81, at 1103–17 (discussing recent 
state legislative reforms in Texas, Georgia, Virginia, Washington, and Mon-
tana); Laurin, supra note 63, at 337–38 (“[T]he most recent wave of commis-
sion formation, which occurred since 2000, has seen the formation of eleven 
new oversight bodies, mostly taking the form of independent state commis-
sions . . . .”).  
 150. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 9. 
 151. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF. RESP., FORMAL OPINION 06-441 5 
(2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ 
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_
441.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 152. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 
(2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ 
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense 
.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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recently won important victories in their state supreme 
courts.153  
Courts around the country have also helped to catalyze in-
digent defense reform. In addition to the recent cases in Florida 
and Missouri, the Washington Supreme Court recently adopted 
caseload limits for public defenders, modeled on the ABA’s 
standards.154 In New York, the ACLU filed a class action law-
suit in state court challenging the constitutionality of the 
state’s indigent defense delivery systems.155 After the New York 
Court of Appeals agreed to let the class action suit proceed to 
discovery, the state settled, agreeing to make significant 
changes to indigent defense delivery systems in five of its coun-
ties.156 And the United States Supreme Court has recently 
paved the way for more ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claims to be heard in federal habeas courts.157 
Federal executive officials are also taking steps to address 
the indigent defense crisis. Former Attorney General Eric 
Holder highlighted the need to address the indigent defense 
crisis shortly before President Obama announced the creation 
of an Office for Access to Justice, designed to work with federal, 
state, and local stakeholders to increase access to effective 
counsel for the poor.158 In 2013, that Office announced $6.7 mil-
lion in federal grants designed to improve legal defense services 
 
 153. See Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 
278 (Fla. 2013); State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 
612 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 154. See Johnson, supra note 125. 
 155. See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219 (N.Y. 2010). 
 156. Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Public Defense in New York 
State, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nyclu.org/ 
news/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-of-public-defense-new-york-state. 
Other ACLU chapters around the country have filed similar lawsuits and gar-
nered other victories. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 
2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (holding that two Washington cities’ public 
defense systems deprived indigent defendants of their Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel); see also Complaint at 2–3, Tucker v. Idaho, No. CV 0C1510240 
(Idaho Dist. Ct. June 17, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/tucker 
-et-al-v-state-idaho-et-al-complaint.  
 157. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. 
Ct. 1309 (2012).  
 158. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the Department of Justice 
National Symposium on Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 
2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general 
-eric-holder-addresses-department-justice-national-symposium-indigent (dis-
cussing the fact that public defenders are “under-funded” and “buried under 
the[ir] caseloads” such that they can’t “interview their clients properly, file ap-
propriate motions, [or] conduct fact investigations”). 
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for the poor.159 Although some of that money was for direct ser-
vices, much of it went to training and leadership development 
for public defender offices and empirical studies designed to 
provide metrics for measuring the quality of indigent defense 
services.160 Federal legislators are now calling for the develop-
ment of a National Criminal Justice Commission to review 
comprehensively state and federal criminal justice systems, in-
cluding indigent defense delivery systems.161 
Researchers have also begun to focus on the indigent de-
fense crisis and are now using empirical tools to assess the effi-
cacy of indigent defense delivery systems.162 Many state indi-
gent defense commissions have pushed for an incorporation of 
evidence-based practices into the provision of indigent defense 
services.163  
Beyond the indigent defense crisis, other political move-
ments surrounding criminal justice issues present possibilities 
for more indirect indigent defense reform. The spate of recent 
DNA exonerations has motivated many in the system to want 
to address errors.164 The National Institute of Justice has an-
nounced that it is partnering with Milwaukee, Philadelphia, 
and Baltimore to pilot a sentinel events review process for the 
criminal justice system.165 The concept of sentinel events re-
view, which was borrowed from the medical and aviation fields, 
takes on board the idea that error is endemic to every system 
and that stakeholders who come together after an error occurs 
to analyze how various aspects of the system led to that error 
can learn lessons that are important to preventing future 
 
 159. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General 
Holder Announces $6.7 Million To Improve Legal Defense Services for the 
Poor (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder 
-announces-67-million-improve-legal-defense-services-poor. 
 160. Id. 
 161. National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2015, S.1119, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
 162. See Laurin, supra note 63, at 340 (describing the push for data). 
 163. Id. at 338–54 (describing the actions of commissions in North Caroli-
na, Texas, and New York). 
 164. See GARRETT, supra note 43, at 5 (describing exonerations). 
 165. James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in the Criminal Justice System: 
Sentinel Event Reviews, in U.S. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MENDING JUSTICE: 
SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247141 
.pdf; see also KATHARINE BROWNING ET AL., PAVING THE WAY: LESSONS 
LEARNED IN SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS 2 (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/249097.pdf. 
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harms.166 Police, prosecutors, defenders, judges and other 
stakeholders in these cities will come together to test the poten-
tial of a systematic, nonblaming effort to learn from error in the 
field. If successful, other cities could think about using sentinel 
events review to suggest policy reforms that would affect indi-
gent defense delivery systems and the criminal justice system 
more generally. 
The focus on reducing mass incarceration also has pro-
spects for helping with the indigent defense crisis. As President 
Obama recently emphasized, even though the U.S. is home to 
only 5% of the world’s population, it houses 25% of the world’s 
prisoners, and it costs over $80 billion a year to maintain this 
prison system.167 Conservative and liberal politicians agree that 
something needs to be done to stem the rising costs of the pris-
on population.168 Many states have begun to focus on decrimi-
nalizing and/or reclassifying low-level offenses as civil infrac-
tions. For example, voters in Washington and Colorado recently 
used ballot measures to legalize marijuana possession169 and 
California voters recently rolled back that state’s “three 
strikes” law by requiring that an offender’s third strike be vio-
lent before it may trigger a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence.170 
On the federal level, the Justice Department’s “Smart on 
Crime” Initiative encourages prosecutors to refocus their efforts 
on the worst offenders and pursue mandatory minimum sen-
tences less often.171 To the extent that the answer to the mass 
 
 166. See BROWNING ET AL., supra note 165, at 3. 
 167. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the NAACP Conference (July 
14, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks 
-president-naacp-conference [hereinafter Remarks by the President]. 
 168. Edwin Meese III started the “Right on Crime” movement and was 
joined by several other notable conservatives who agree that we need to reduce 
incarceration. See Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, http:// 
rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016); Peter Baker, ‘16 Rivals Unite in Push To Alter Jus-
tice System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2015, at A1; Charlie Savage, Trend To Light-
en Harsh Sentences Catches on in Conservative States, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
2011, at A14. 
 169. See Sam Becker, Seven States on the Verge of Marijuana Legalization, 
CHEAT SHEET (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.cheatsheet.com/business/5-states 
-and-one-city-ready-to-legalize-marijuana.html.  
 170. See Erik Eckholm, Out of Prison, and Staying Out, After 3rd Strike in 
California, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/ 
us/california-convicts-are-out-of-prison-after-third-strike-and-staying-out 
.html.  
 171. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Aug. 2013), http://www.justice 
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incarceration problem involves decriminalization, reclassifica-
tion, and/or fewer criminal prosecutions, it could significantly 
reduce public defender caseloads.172 
I do not want to overstate the case. Many are pessimistic 
that real change in indigent defense is likely to come.173 And 
given how long these cultural problems in indigent defense de-
livery systems have existed and how difficult it is to generate 
the requisite political will to help indigent criminal defend-
ants,174 their skepticism is understandable. That said, given the 
trends described above, it seems that there is at least some 
room for reform. So it is important to think about what sorts of 
reforms would be effective. My suggestion, of course, is that we 
should be thinking in particular about structural reforms that 
will improve the culture of indigent defense delivery. 
 
.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf. President 
Obama has called on Congress to reduce or eliminate mandatory minimum 
sentences for non-violent drug offenders and has begun commuting the sen-
tences of dozens of people who were given lengthy prison sentences for non-
violent drug convictions. See Remarks by the President, supra note 167. Bipar-
tisan legislation is currently making its way through an otherwise-gridlocked 
Congress to reduce the number of mandatory minimum sentences imposed for 
non-violent drug offenders. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 
2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th 
-congress/senate-bill/2123/text; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office 
of Pub. Affairs, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Written Testi-
mony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Sentencing Reform and 
Corrections Act of 2015 (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deputy 
-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-written-testimony-senate-judiciary 
-committee (expressing support for the bipartisan bill).  
 172. See, e.g., THE SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED, supra note 120, at 9, 17 
(describing one county in Washington that created a diversion program for 
suspended drivers that reduced defender caseloads by one-third); see also Car-
ol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 
2701 (2013) (noting that reclassification and diversion can “reduc[e] defender 
caseloads while also conserving scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources”). 
 173. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri L. Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 
122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2147 (2013) (lamenting that “Gideon will remain an un-
fulfilled dream of what could and should have been”); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
445, 449 (2015) (explaining how “the formalist Gideon framework . . . falls 
apart as a descriptive mechanism at the bottom”); George C. Thomas, III, How 
Gideon v. Wainwright Became Goldilocks, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 318 
(2015) (“[L]egislatures ignore the many pleas for better funding for indigent 
defense because they have as much defense as they want . . . .”). 
 174. See generally Steiker, supra note 172 (describing the failure of Gideon 
to live up to its potential as a failure of political will). 
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III.  FOCUSING REFORM PROPOSALS ON IMPROVING 
DEFENDER CULTURE   
As reformers think about ways to fix this country’s broken 
indigent defense delivery systems, they must address 
longstanding cultural problems.175 In this Part, I will discuss 
proposals for reform. More specifically, I will examine how 
changes in structure, training, and oversight could improve the 
culture of indigent defense.  
A. STRUCTURE  
A focus on ensuring a culture of zealous, client-centered 
advocacy should push states toward the adoption of statewide 
public defender systems in lieu of county-based or assigned-
counsel systems. It should ensure structural independence and 
statewide funding for public defender’s offices. It should also 
inform how those offices are internally structured. The interest 
in fostering a proper culture of client-centered advocacy should 
also affect the structure of panel systems, which will always be 
necessary to deal with conflicts cases. I will discuss each of the-
se in turn. 
Public Defenders Instead of Appointed-Counsel Systems. 
Fifty-five years ago, symposium writers recognized that a pub-
lic defender system would provide more zealous and effective 
advocacy for indigent defendants than an assigned-counsel sys-
tem.176 Empirical research has proven them right.177 From a cul-
tural perspective, a public defender system has a number of 
advantages over the assigned-counsel system. Placing defend-
ers together in one geographic location catalyzes collaboration, 
the sharing of information, and the development of support sys-
tems that are otherwise unlikely to develop. A public defender’s 
office with regular brainstorming sessions draws on the collec-
tive experience and wisdom of the group. It promotes the devel-
opment of an expert, professional defense bar. The physical 
proximity of the attorneys provides opportunities for informal 
mentoring and emotional support.  
For all of these reasons, more and more states have recog-
nized the need for organized and dedicated public defender of-
 
 175. See supra Part I. 
 176. See, e.g., Cuff, supra note 129, at 722–23; David, supra note 23, at 
760–62; Pollock, supra note 49, at 744–47. 
 177. See sources collected supra notes 126–28.  
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fices.178 That said, there are still a significant number of coun-
ties where indigent defense representation is handled by as-
signed attorneys.179 As reforms are contemplated, the first step 
toward changing culture is creating centralized public defender 
offices where attorneys can lean on one another, develop exper-
tise, get necessary support, and find strength in their numbers. 
Statewide Public Defender Office Rather than County-
Based System. As discussed above, the structural decision to lo-
cate funding and organizational responsibility for the provision 
of indigent defense at the county level creates a more impover-
ished and less stable defender culture.180 The public defender’s 
budget waxes and wanes as a result of the county’s relative 
wealth and crime rate.181 And a county-based system is far 
more likely to be dependent on local politics.182 This undermines 
defenders’ abilities to provide zealous, client-centered represen-
tation. Reformers should recognize that statewide public de-
fender offices are more able to create a culture of zealous advo-
cacy, because they have more stable institutional resources, 
collective bargaining power, combined expertise, and independ-
ence than county-based public defender systems. The American 
Bar Association has indicated in the past that statewide sys-
tems are preferable to county-based systems.183 In its 1992 
Standards for Criminal Justice, the ABA explained that 
“[c]onditions may make it preferable to create a statewide sys-
tem of defense,”184 and the commentary to that provision em-
phasized that state programs “have shown their ability to grow 
 
 178. See INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 20 (describing public 
defender offices in the states). 
 179. See id. 
 180. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 181. See, e.g., Rapping, supra note 4, at 183–84. 
 182. See discussion supra Part I.B. Local political control might be advan-
tageous for prosecutors who have to make community judgments about 
whether to pursue charges. When community values are at issue, the more 
localized the decisionmaker, the more that decisionmaker might be beholden 
to the community that she represents. However, local control is disadvanta-
geous for defenders whose job is to provide zealous, client-centered advocacy. 
As discussed supra Part I, local political and financial pressures often under-
mine zealous defense advocacy. 
 183. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 
§ 5-1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/  
criminal_ justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_defsvcs_blk.html. 
 184. Id.  
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and change with the times while maintaining financial stabil-
ity.”185  
If a state cannot create a statewide defender office either 
due to a lack of resources or a failure of political will, it should 
still attempt to replicate some of the cultural benefits that come 
from statewide offices. It should try to provide statewide fund-
ing of indigent defense even if the delivery systems are chosen 
at the county level.186 That would at least ensure more financial 
stability and more independence from the influence of local pol-
itics. The state could also condition receipt of state funding on 
the development of certain practices that facilitate good profes-
sional culture,187 including regular meetings and brainstorming 
sessions for defenders, regular meetings of the county public 
defender chiefs with an eye toward collaboration, and the 
maintenance of statewide databases and email listservs for 
communication and distribution of materials so as to capitalize 
on the expertise of others in different counties.188  
Structural Independence. Public defender agencies need to 
be sufficiently independent of governmental officials—
executive, legislative, or judicial—that they can provide zealous 
representation to their clients without fear of losing their jobs 
or their funding. There was some debate in the 1961 right-to-
counsel symposium about how best to achieve this independ-
ence, with the major question being whether a defender associ-
ation should be an independent, non-profit corporation gov-
erned by a board of directors or a government agency.189  
 
 185. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SER-
VICES § 5-1.2 Commentary 9–10 (3d ed. 1992). 
 186. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 32, at 55–57 (describing trend toward 
statewide funding); see also SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-
RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE, JUSTICE POLICY INST. 4 (2011), http://www 
.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/system_overload_final.pdf 
(“[I]n the past decade, more systems have been moving towards full or greater 
statewide funding, recognizing that statewide funding structures offer a num-
ber of advantages.”). 
 187. Cf. Steiker, supra note 172, at 2709 (suggesting that the federal gov-
ernment should condition disbursement of federal funds for criminal justice 
upon state compliance with minimal standards for the provision of indigent 
defense). 
 188. In Michigan, for example, the State Appellate Defender Office has 
created a legal resources website where attorneys throughout the state can 
access motions, briefs, manuals, and training materials. See THE SOLUTION IS 
MULTIFACETED, supra note 120. 
 189. Compare Cuff, supra note 129, at 720–22 (extolling the virtues of a 
state-sponsored public defender system), with Pollock, supra note 49, at 747–
49 (arguing for a voluntary defender). 
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The major advantage of organizing a public defender office 
as a non-profit corporation is independence. The Defender As-
sociation of Philadelphia, for example, has a Board composed of 
three groups of directors chosen by three different constituen-
cies––the city government, the organized bar, and the commu-
nity.190 Under that structure, the government cannot fire the 
chief defender if zealous representation is compromising too 
many prosecutions. At the same time, there is also a risk that 
the funding for a non-profit organization will not be stable.191 A 
government-funded public defender has more financial stability 
but also may not be as independent.192 The best system would 
be one that is state funded but has an independent, public in-
terest board of trustees.193 Obviously, there will be tradeoffs be-
tween how much the state is willing to fund a public defender 
organization and how much control it has over that agency. Re-
formers will have to make difficult choices along these lines, 
but these choices should be made with an understanding that 
independence is absolutely essential to a culture of zealous ad-
vocacy.  
Internal Structure. Internally, public defender offices can 
do more to develop a culture of zealous, client-centered advoca-
cy. They can adopt standards that include caseload limits and 
lobby the legislature or resort to the courts to try and enforce 
 
 190. History, DEF. ASS’N OF PHILA., http://www.philadefender.org/history 
.php (last visited Apr. 4,2016).  
 191. As one Philadelphia defender writing for the symposium recognized, 
“the United Fund on which the Defender Association heavily relies for finan-
cial support has not been able to provide even the minimum needed by the As-
sociation to maintain present services.” Pollock, supra note 49, at 751. 
 192. The Maryland Office of the Public Defender, for example, has a thir-
teen member Board of Trustees, but eleven members are “appointed by the 
Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate and one member each ap-
pointed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Dele-
gates.” The Board, in turn, appoints the Public Defender for a six-year term. 
See PAUL B. DEWOLFE, STATE OF MD. OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEF., FISCAL YEAR 
2014 ANNUAL REPORT WITH STRATEGIC PLAN 10 (2014), http://www.opd.state 
.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/OPD_Annual_Report%20_2014.pdf. More than 
once, the Board has been accused of removing a public defender for political 
reasons. See, e.g., Bykowicz & Bishop, supra note 33; Ogletree, supra note 4, at 
90 n.45 (describing the removal of a prior Maryland Public Defender “as a di-
rect result of his criticisms of the criminal justice system in general, and the 
judiciary in particular”). 
 193. The Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C., for example, is a 
federally-funded independent organization. See Mission & Purpose, PUB. DEF. 
SERV. FOR D.C., http://www.pdsdc.org/about-us/mission-purpose (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2016). 
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them.194 Empirical research shows that caseload caps work. At-
torneys are able to spend more time with their clients, investi-
gate cases more thoroughly, and provide better, more zealous 
representation when their cases are capped.195 Indigent defense 
delivery systems in Washington, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin 
operate with caseload limits, some imposed by judicial decision 
and others by statute.196 
Obviously, public defender offices can do more with train-
ing, which I will discuss below. But in terms of structure, there 
are a number of other small ways to encourage zealous, client-
centered advocacy. Regular office meetings and brainstorming 
sessions where attorneys talk about developing client relation-
ships or discuss structural problems in the courtrooms and 
brainstorm strategies for effectuating change would go a long 
way, both in communicating the importance of zealous advoca-
cy and in finding ways to support one another to make it hap-
pen.197 
Public defender administrators should avoid assigning at-
torneys to one courtroom for an extended period of time to en-
sure that they remain independent of the judiciary. At the 
same time, they should avoid horizontal representation sys-
tems, under which attorneys are assigned to stages of the crim-
inal process rather than clients. Vertical representation sys-
tems that allow one attorney to form a relationship with and 
represent the client throughout all the stages of the trial pro-
cess promote more client-centered advocacy. 
Reformers can also be creative in thinking about ways to 
structure defenders’ dockets so as to ensure zealous advocacy. 
In one Minnesota county, the chief defender worked with the 
prosecutor’s office and the local judges to restructure the crimi-
nal docket to reduce the number of days when defenders had to 
be in court in order to give them some non-courtroom days to do 
important work on their cases.198 The chief defender was then 
able to convey an important cultural message to his line attor-
 
 194. See sources collected supra notes 122–25. 
 195. MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORMS IN 
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK: AN ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY CASE CAPS AND ATTOR-
NEY WORKLOAD (2015), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/  
documents/Case_Caps%20_NYC_0.pdf. 
 196. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 24. 
 197. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 92–93 (describing how the Public De-
fender Service for Washington, D.C. has such meetings and how effective they 
are). 
 198. THE SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED, supra note 120, at 24. 
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neys: I have created time for you to meet with your clients, de-
velop relationships with them, investigate and research your 
cases, and formulate trial strategies. That message from an 
administrator has important effects on the development of the 
professional culture. 
Structuring Panel Attorney Systems. Even when public de-
fenders are the primary indigent defense providers in a juris-
diction, there will be cases that present conflicts of interest.199 
Thus, some alternative method for providing assigned counsel 
will be necessary. When devising or revising assigned-counsel 
systems, states should strive to ensure that there is still a cul-
ture of vigorous advocacy. There are a number of ways to 
achieve this.  
In some jurisdictions, well-funded law firms have taken it 
upon themselves to create privately funded pro bono groups 
that partner with local public defender offices to take on indi-
gent defense cases. Their young associates, many of whom want 
to do pro bono work, are trained by the public defender office 
and do work in conjunction with the office to learn the workings 
of the system.200 These firms are then equipped with trained at-
torneys who have the financial resources and time to provide 
zealous advocacy and can take conflict cases. Another possibil-
ity is for the firm itself to hire an experienced and zealous for-
mer defender who then works in house with the firm’s associ-
ates to guide them as they take on criminal cases.201  
If that model is not available and the jurisdiction needs to 
resort to an assigned-attorney system, there are a number of 
steps that should be taken to encourage zealous advocacy. 
First, panel attorneys’ compensation should be structured to 
incentivize zealous advocacy and not encourage mass pro-
cessing. Flat-fee contract systems should be replaced with sys-
tems that pay assigned counsel a reasonable hourly wage.202 
And regardless of the wage rate, oversight mechanisms should 
 
 199. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (discussing conflicts). 
 200. Williams & Connolly LLP has, for years, been partnering with the 
public defender office in Montgomery County, Maryland. See Pro Bono, 
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, https://www.wc.com/probono.html (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2016). 
 201. Arnold and Porter has done this through its creation of a “trial train-
ing counsel” position. See Steiker, supra note 172, at 2710 (discussing this 
program). 
 202. See Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 30 (advocating the ban of 
flat-fee contracts). 
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reward zealous attorneys with future appointments so as to en-
courage good representation instead of valuing expediency.  
Alternatively, counties that need to rely on assigned-
counsel systems could follow the lead of Comal County, Texas, 
and experiment with a client-choice model of assignment.203 
With the support of the Texas Indigent Defense Commission, 
indigent defendants in Comal County are permitted to select 
the attorneys who will represent them at state expense.204 At-
torneys who communicate effectively with their clients and 
partner with them will be sought after, while those who ignore 
their clients’ wishes will not get business. Many believe that 
the competition this will generate will drive bad attorneys out 
of the market.205 Whether that will in fact be the predominant 
result of a client-choice system remains to be seen. It could well 
have positive cultural effects. It could also create an aura of 
competition that is destructive to the culture—for example, if 
attorneys refuse to share resources or advice with one another 
for fear of helping the competition. When the program’s efficacy 
is assessed, particular attention should be paid to the culture it 
has created and whether it has promoted or hindered zealous, 
client-centered advocacy. 
States should also be careful to structure any assigned-
counsel, panel systems in ways that encourage zealous advoca-
cy and avoid the funding, independence, isolation, and training 
problems that often infect such systems. Panel systems should 
be funded at the state level and attorneys should be paid out of 
a general fund managed by the local bar association or indigent 
defense commission rather than by the judges before whom the 
lawyers appear.206 Similarly, panel attorneys should not have to 
get judicial approval to hire experts.207 That too needs to be con-
trolled by a community or public service board. There should be 
a supervisor for panel attorneys (a former public defender with 
experience) who leads regular meetings and instills a culture of 
vigorous and zealous advocacy in order to combat the problems 
of attorney isolation. Panel attorneys should attend required 
training sessions that focus on developing rapport with clients 
 
 203. For a full description of the Comal County program, see Schulhofer, 
supra note 20, at 544–56.  
 204. Id. at 509. 
 205. See id. at 523.  
 206. Many recently created indigent defense commissions are assuming 
this responsibility. See INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 20 (explain-
ing the roles of various indigent defense commissions). 
 207. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 86 (discussing this problem). 
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and overcoming cultural problems in the system and they 
should meet regularly with the local public defenders and de-
velop a collaborative relationship with them in order to take 
advantage of some of the benefits of the group culture.208 
B. TRAINING 
Many of the current training programs don’t equip enter-
ing public defenders to be zealous advocates for their clients. 
Reform proposals should be attentive to and think about ways 
to use training programs to correct that problem.209 As Jona-
than Rapping has argued, this training should begin in law 
schools.210 More law schools should teach students the realities 
of indigent defense representation and help them think about 
strategies to challenge and improve deficient indigent defense 
delivery systems.211 This can be done in the classroom through 
a structured criminal justice program,212 through criminal de-
fense clinics, or outside the classroom as part of a defender or-
ganization.213 Law students who want to be public defenders 
should learn trial advocacy skills, but they should also learn 
about the many other skills that effective defenders need to 
have: how to develop a relationship with a client and learn to 
tell his story, how to investigate a criminal case and form a 
 
 208. The Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C. regularly invites 
panel attorneys to attend its training sessions. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 
90–91 (discussing this training).  
 209. See id. (explaining the training at the D.C. Public Defender Service); 
Steiker, supra note 172, at 2710–11 (discussing the need for training).  
 210. Jonathan A. Rapping, Grooming Tomorrow’s Change Agents: The Role 
of Law Schools in Helping To Create a Just Society, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
465, 487–98 (2015) (discussing how law schools can take steps to educate fu-
ture lawyers in ways that change culture in the criminal justice system).  
 211. See id. at 504 (“[I]f we are to transform legal systems designed to drive 
unjust outcomes, we must do more than equip law graduates with the skills 
and values necessary to be effective practitioners and steer them into careers 
that serve the public interest. We must ensure that they appreciate the chal-
lenges they will face as they strive to provide clients with what they deserve 
and arm them with strategies to change those systems.”); Steiker, supra note 
172, at 2711 (“The legal academy has the privilege and responsibility of initi-
ating young lawyers into the norms of the legal profession and educating them 
about the gaps between the system’s ideals and its realities.”). 
 212. Jonathan Rapping has created an honors program in criminal justice 
at Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School. See Rapping, supra note 210, at 501–
03 (describing the program). 
 213. At the University of Michigan Law School, the criminal justice faculty 
has created a group called “MDefenders,” which is designed, in part, to give 
students an opportunity to talk about the challenges that public defenders face 
and brainstorm strategies for dealing with those challenges. 
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case strategy, how to negotiate with prosecutors who hold way 
too much power, and how to fight against the pressure to pro-
cess clients through the system. 
After law school, entry-level public defenders need to go 
through comprehensive training programs that teach them not 
just about trial advocacy or the mechanics of the court system 
they are entering but also how to relate to clients and deal with 
the challenges of the job. The non-profit organization Gideon’s 
Promise provides a model for this kind of training.214 Working 
together, Gideon’s Promise and a set of public defender agen-
cies select law school graduates who will first be trained by 
Gideon’s Promise and then go to work as public defenders at 
the partner agencies.215 Gideon’s Promise fellows go through 
two weeks of intensive training designed to teach them how to 
build a supportive defender community, communicate with 
(and especially listen to) their clients, be excellent advocates, 
and overcome the challenges of this kind of work.216 After going 
to their respective offices, the fellows come together again for a 
weekend every six months for three years to talk about the 
challenges they face and to get necessary support.217 Moreover, 
each fellow is assigned to an experienced mentor for this three-
year period.218 This type of sustained, long-term investment in 
young public defenders is vital to cultural change.219 Important-
ly, Gideon’s Promise also provides training for public defense 
administrators to give them an opportunity to come together 
and think about how to shape the culture of indigent defense 
delivery systems going forward.220  
Reform proposals that seek to ensure more and better 
training of public defenders should be attentive to whether the 
type of training that is being offered will address these cultural 
issues. Local bar associations and other organizations that offer 
 
 214. For a more detailed description of the training that Gideon’s Promise 
provides, see Our Mission, Our Movement, GIDEON’S PROMISE, http://www 
.gideonspromise.org/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).  
 215. Law School Partnership Program, GIDEON’S PROMISE, http://www 
.gideonspromise.org/programs/lspp (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 216. Core 101, GIDEON’S PROMISE, http://www.gideonspromise.org/  
programs/core-101 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Ogletree, supra note 4, at 92 (discussing the importance of ongoing 
training that takes place after an attorney has been practicing). 
 220. See Leadership, GIDEON’S PROMISE, http://www.gideonspromise.org/ 
programs/leadership (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
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continuing legal education should be similarly attentive to the 
need to offer training that addresses agency culture in addition 
to training that informs indigent defense lawyers about devel-
opments in the law.221  
Recently, a number of scholars have argued that non-
lawyers should be permitted to represent criminal defendants 
in limited circumstances so as to ease the caseload burdens on 
public defenders.222 Should the profession decide to let parale-
gals, social workers, or other non-lawyers play a larger role in 
indigent defense representation, it is crucial that these lay pro-
fessionals be brought into the system with proper training and 
with the understanding that their role is to communicate effec-
tively with and zealously advocate for indigent criminal de-
fendants. The entry of a new population into the work force is 
an opportunity to effectuate a cultural shift.223  
C. OVERSIGHT 
Reforms should ensure that there is some meaningful over-
sight of defense counsel and that part of that oversight focuses 
on whether defense attorneys are providing zealous, client-
centered representation. Public defender offices, local bar asso-
ciations and indigent defense commissions, the judiciary, and 
the federal government all have roles to play in ensuring that 
defense attorneys provide zealous representation. 
 
 221. The Public Defender Service of Washington D.C. has an intensive, cli-
ent-centered training program for entry-level attorneys as well as year-round 
continuing training requirements for practicing lawyers. See generally 
Ogletree, supra note 4, at 90–93 (discussing the PDS training model). Much of 
the material that PDS and other trailblazing public defender agencies who 
have excellent training programs use is available online or at the request of a 
public defender agency. 
 222. See Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 113, 127 
(2012) (advocating for lay advocacy in juvenile and misdemeanor cases); see 
also Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel 
Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 994 (2012) 
(“Where the law is simple and disputes are factual, paralegals, investigators, 
and social workers can help to investigate facts, marshal evidence, and pre-
pare clients to tell their own stories.”); Drinan, supra note 71, at 1335–44 (ar-
guing that “lay advocates can be an effective alternative to legal counsel” and 
suggesting possible roles for them in juvenile, misdemeanor, and bail review 
hearings).  
 223. I do not mean to take a position on whether or to what extent greater 
incorporation of lay professionals into the criminal justice system is a good 
idea. I am merely suggesting that if lay professionals are going to play a larger 
role in the system, they should be trained in ways that promote a culture of 
zealous defender advocacy. 
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Public Defender Offices. Cultural change, to be effective, 
has to be supported by the leaders of the affected organiza-
tion.224 When entry-level public defenders are hired, their initial 
training should be followed by a period of supervision during 
which the importance of zealous, client-centered advocacy is 
stressed.225 After that period, entry-level defenders should con-
tinue to have mentors who regularly check in with them during 
their first year or two to ensure that they don’t become cynical 
or disillusioned.226 
Administrators in public defender offices should develop 
metrics designed to measure the performance of their line at-
torneys and should, at regular intervals, evaluate their pro-
gress. These metrics should take into account factors that indi-
cate how zealously the attorney has represented his clients. 
The public defender office in El Paso, Texas, for example, sur-
veys its clients when they enter the criminal justice system (be-
fore they meet their lawyers) to determine what they want and 
most value from their attorneys and then does an exit survey to 
gauge how effective its attorneys were at meeting those expec-
tations.227 Client feedback is important in determining whether 
the clients feel that they have been listened to and are partners 
in determining the course of their cases.  
Of course, client feedback is not the only relevant factor. 
Senior attorneys should observe and evaluate junior attor-
neys—just as would occur in other professional environments. 
Administrators should review court transcripts involving the 
attorney at regular intervals. They should speak with attor-
neys, investigators, and support staff who work with the attor-
ney. They should consider what post-hiring training opportuni-
ties the attorney has taken advantage of and how she has 
performed in those exercises. The evaluation should also con-
sider the candidate’s reputation in the legal community. I re-
 
 224. See David H. Bayley, Law Enforcement and the Rule of Law: Is There 
a Tradeoff?, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 133, 148 (2002) (arguing that, in 
order to change the mindset of the rank and file, it is necessary to convince the 
leadership to set the right tone and citing research showing that organizations 
are the most powerful determinants of the behavior of the people within 
them). 
 225. In Philadelphia, a supervisor shadows each entry-level public defend-
er for a week after they complete training. See Training and Continuing Legal 
Education, DEF. ASS’N OF PHILA., http://www.philadefender.org/training.php 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016).   
 226. See sources cited supra notes 211–19. 
 227. Hernandez & Powell, supra note 97, at 2370 (describing the survey). 
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cently read a trial transcript in which the trial judge explained 
to the jury before the trial started that it was “a real pleasure” 
for him to have that particular defense attorney in the room, 
because that appointed attorney didn’t “get into wasted argu-
ments.”228 An attorney who is well liked by the judiciary or by 
the prosecution for not objecting or slowing things down is not 
someone who is being a zealous advocate for his clients. Per-
haps it is not surprising that this attorney, who was praised by 
the judge for moving things along, was also quite willing to call 
his own client a “jerk,” an “ass,” and an “insufferable” person in 
his closing arguments to the jury.229 Indigent defense systems 
need performance reviews that would force supervisors to no-
tice when an attorney disparages his own client this way, and 
the supervisor in such an instances should send a clear mes-
sage that insulting your own client to the jury undermines the 
attorney-client relationship and will typically violate an attor-
ney’s duty of loyalty to his client.  
Attorneys who are not providing zealous representation 
should be given additional training, re-evaluated, and ultimate-
ly let go if they do not improve.230 Attorneys who are doing an 
excellent job should be rewarded with praise even if monetary 
incentives are not available. Something as small as an e-mail 
from the chief defender commending an attorney on a job well 
done or a statement at the beginning of the weekly staff meet-
ing about some lawyers who went above and beyond that week 
can do a lot for office morale and encourage a culture of zealous 
advocacy.231  
 
 228. Transcript of Trial Testimony Vol. 1 at 130, State v. Andrew Maurice 
Randolph, No. 13-33003-FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 2014) (on file with author). 
 229. Id. Vol. III at 100, 101, 109 (on file with author). 
 230. Sixty years ago, it was hard to find good attorneys who wanted to rep-
resent indigent criminal defendants, because elite law schools did not present 
indigent defense as a viable career option, and defender jobs on the East Coast 
were essentially voluntary in nature with either no salary or such a low salary 
that it made the job unattractive. See Mayeux, supra note 69, at 21–22 (de-
scribing this trend in the east). As “public interest law” became a growing 
phenomenon in the latter part of the twentieth century and as more states de-
veloped public defender organizations in the wake of Gideon, more lawyers 
wanted these jobs. Now reputable public defender offices turn away scores of 
applicants and have much more choice in hiring. There is competition for the-
se jobs, and there is no reason why public defender offices cannot find zealous 
advocates. 
 231. Leaders can support office morale and promote zealous advocacy in 
other ways. See, e.g., Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 47 (describing an-
nual public defender conferences in many states, which allow public defenders 
from across the state come together to learn from one another). Weekly or 
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Local Bar Associations and Indigent Defense Commissions. 
Local bar associations and indigent defense commissions can 
play important oversight roles as well.232 By collecting and pub-
lishing data that reveals how effective local indigent defense 
delivery systems are at providing zealous, client-centered advo-
cacy, these organizations can shed light on which offices need 
reform while at the same time describing how model offices 
have been able to achieve success.  
Amy Bach’s “Criminal Justice Index” ranks courts on the 
basis of a number of metrics like cost, crime reduction, fairness, 
and accurate outcomes.233 Local bar associations or indigent de-
fense commissions could develop a similar “Zealous Defender 
Index” to measure how a defender office is doing in creating a 
culture that promotes zealous, client-centered advocacy.234 An 
office’s rankings would take into account many of the factors 
that I discuss in this Article. Oversight commissions would per-
form site visits, observe defenders in court, talk to former cli-
ents, and read trial transcripts as part of regular performance 
reviews and then rank the office. Perhaps the development of a 
“Zealous Defender Index” would catalyze a focus on the im-
portance of promoting a culture of zealous advocacy and lead to 
improvements in a number of places. 
Finally, local bar associations and indigent defense 
commissions could coordinate and superintend the oversight of 
appointed panel attorneys and ensure that they are getting the 
training and support that they needed to be effective, zealous 
advocates. They could appoint a supervisor for the panel attor-
neys and ensure that she regularly reviews the performance of 
panel attorneys through observation, an analysis of any com-
 
monthly newsletters with inspiring stories about the amazing work that public 
defenders do and how much it means to their clients can help promote zealous, 
client-centered advocacy. Media stories about the work that public defenders 
do are also important, both to promote the development of a culture of zealous 
advocacy and to educate the public about the valuable role defenders play. See 
Steiker, supra note 172, at 2711 (discussing the important role of the media). 
 232. See e.g., Steiker, supra note 172, at 2705 (“State bar associations can 
also be important allies for indigent defense reformers not only in setting 
standards for attorney performance, but also in promoting information gather-
ing and ultimately in producing legislation or facilitating litigation.”). 
 233. See The Solution, MEASURES FOR JUSTICE http://www 
.measuresforjustice.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).  
 234. See Steiker, supra note 172, at 2708 (advocating for some ranking sys-
tem for indigent defense services). 
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plaints filed, reading transcripts, and looking through case 
files.235 
Judiciary. Judges shape the structural conditions that ei-
ther foster or undermine a professional culture in which de-
fenders provide vigorous advocacy. Trial judges should be sen-
sitive to caseload pressures and resource constraints and be 
more willing to take creative pre-trial steps to address these is-
sues. For example, Donald Dripps has argued that courts, dur-
ing initial plea colloquies, should inquire in open court and 
make an affirmative finding that defense counsel has provided 
effective assistance before being willing to enter a guilty plea.236 
Similarly, he contends that trial courts should inquire before a 
trial whether the defense is institutionally equipped to litigate 
as effectively as the prosecution.237 Judges who took steps to ac-
tively encourage a culture of zealous defense advocacy could do 
a lot to catalyze cultural change.238 
Courts should also be more willing to entertain legal chal-
lenges to indigent defense delivery systems and use their su-
pervisory powers to impose caseload limits or catalyze legisla-
tive reforms. As discussed above, courts in Missouri and 
Florida have taken bold steps forward by empowering public 
defenders to withdraw from or prevent future appointments in 
cases once their caseloads reach a certain level.239 The Wash-
ington State Supreme Court went even further and actually 
approved of specific caseload limits.240 
In many states, the mere threat that the judiciary is going 
to get involved has been sufficient to prompt legislative action. 
In Massachusetts, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme 
 
 235. See Boruchowitz et al., supra note 10, at 41 (making a similar recom-
mendation). 
 236. Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in 
the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 918 (2013) (argu-
ing that courts could rule “that effective assistance of counsel must be estab-
lished affirmatively at the plea colloquy”). 
 237. Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex 
Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (“My 
thesis holds that the Strickland inquiry into counsel’s effectiveness ex post 
should be supplement [sic] by an ex ante inquiry into whether the defense is 
institutionally equipped to litigate as effectively as the prosecution.”). 
 238. See Steiker, supra note 172, at 2705 (imploring trial judges to refer 
inadequate lawyers to the bar for discipline). 
 239. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 
279 (Fla. 2013); State ex. rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 240. See Johnson, supra note 125.  
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Judicial Court once threatened that it was going to order the 
release of all defendants detained pre-trial unless attorneys 
were appointed for them within a specific time period.241 In re-
sponse, the Massachusetts legislature increased the defender 
office’s funding.242 Cases in Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, and Louisiana have all catalyzed similar re-
forms.243 Judges can and should use their role in the system to 
catalyze structural changes and ensure zealous advocacy.244 
Federal Government. Finally, the federal government could 
do more to encourage zealous defense advocacy. Congress 
should pass proposed legislation creating a National Criminal 
Justice Commission, which would create an oversight body de-
signed to review state and federal criminal justice systems and 
make recommendations for improvement.245 As part of its mis-
sion, that body should focus on ways to create a more zealous, 
client-centered advocacy system in indigent defense delivery 
systems and should develop recommendations for granting or 
conditioning the grant of federal resources on steps that would 
improve defender culture. And the federal government should 
continue to earmark federal grants for states who are creative-
 
 241. Steiker, supra note 172, at 2703. 
 242. Id.  
 243. See Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic 
Litigation in Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel 17–36 (Wash. U. 
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 1279185, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279185 (discussing cases). 
 244. Public defender offices should also be willing to encourage civil rights 
organizations or law firms with significant pro bono practices to file civil class 
actions on behalf of indigent defendants alleging that systemic deficiencies in 
the indigent defense delivery system present a substantial risk of irreparable 
injury and seeking injunctive or declaratory judgments. These suits are time- 
and resource-intensive and have met with mixed results. See 3 CRIM. PROC.  
§ 11.8(c) n.69 (3d ed. 2007) (describing cases); see also Drinan, supra note 71, 
at 1330–33 (noting that these suits should be used as a “last resort”). If effec-
tive, however, they have the potential to catalyze increased resources, caseload 
caps, or other systemic changes that could positively affect the culture of indi-
gent defense delivery systems. 
 245. National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2015, S. 1119, 114th 
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1119. As 
I have argued elsewhere, Congress could also enact legislation that would give 
the Justice Department and other deputized interest groups the power to file 
enforcement actions against states that engage in a pattern or practice of con-
duct that deprives criminal defendants of their right to effective counsel. See 
EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, LITIGA-
TION STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Primus_-_Litigation_Strategies.pdf.  
  
2016] CULTURE AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 1821 
 
ly implementing some of the changes discussed above to ensure 
a culture of zealous advocacy in their offices.246 
As reformers think about how to improve on indigent de-
fense delivery systems in this country, they need to consider 
how the very structure of an indigent defense delivery system 
often serves to inhibit zealous, client-centered advocacy. Poli-
cymakers should strive to create independent, state-funded, 
statewide public defender offices that train entry-level defend-
ers to be zealous, client-centered advocates. They also need to 
ensure that there is sufficient oversight of public defenders’ 
performance to ensure that vigorous advocacy becomes an in-
grained part of the culture of indigent defense delivery in this 
country.  
 
  CONCLUSION   
Fifty years after Gideon v. Wainwright recognized a fun-
damental, constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases, in-
digent defense delivery systems in this country remain struc-
tured in ways that inhibit zealous, client-centered defense 
advocacy. With unstable, local funding sources; a lack of inde-
pendence from the judiciary and the political branches of gov-
ernment; scattered and isolated appointed counsel who have no 
financial incentives to provide zealous advocacy; inadequate 
training; and a lack of sufficient oversight, it is unsurprising 
that there is a serious cultural problem in the delivery of indi-
gent defense services. 
But there is some reason for optimism about the future. 
Legislators, executive branch officials, and judges have focused 
on the indigent defense crisis, and many states have created 
indigent defense commissions to consider ways to fix our bro-
ken indigent defense delivery systems. As reformers think 
about how to move forward, they need to address the cultural 
problems that have long stood at the center of the crisis. Per-
haps then we can begin to realize some of the ideals that Jus-
tice Douglas and others so wisely advocated for over fifty-five 
years ago. 
 
 
 
 246. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 
159.  
